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ABSTRACT
The Ship Project Directive (SPD) System is the vehicle by which
all Ship Acquisition Project Managers (SHAPMs) transmit their plans
and requirements to a Participating Manager (PARM) for the procure-
ment of Government Furnished Materials (GFM). Problems associated
with implementing the SPD System, as defined by NAVSHIPS Instruction
7000. 29B, were identified and investigated by interviews and question-
naires. As a result of this investigation, specific recommendations
are made which will, in the authors' opinions, correct these defi-
ciencies in the process.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In testimony before the Proxmire Sub-committee on Economy in
Government of the Joint Economic Committee in May 1970. F. Trow-
bridge vom Baur has stated that some 10-12 billion dollars are wasted
annually in the Department of Defense Procurement process. He
further asserted that elimination, or at least minimization, of this
waste was well within the capabilities of the Executive branch of
government.
In supporting this viewpoint Mr. vom Baur addressed several
areas where governmental inefficiencies resulted in waste, late
delivery of equipment and unacceptable cost over-runs -- all as a
result of poor management practices on the part of procurement
activities within the DOD. Among the areas which he cited as illus-
trative of this governmental mismanagement were delays in delivery
of Government Furnished Equipment (GFE: Equipment and subsystems
procured separately by the Government for installation by the contrac-
tor) and Delivery of Defective Government Furnished Equipment both
of which open the door for the contractor to file a claim; a claim which
will ultimately contribute significantly to a cost over-run. Without
identifying the program he cited an example of delivery of a govern-
ment furnished boiler for a warship fourteen months late -- fourteen
months in which the contractor's work was seriously curtailed and in

which the government ultimately paid for at least a portion of the costs
associated with that delay. Additionally, he has cited instances where
the shipbuilder has been prepared to receive one model of a particular
piece of equipment (as specified in the Schedule A of his contract) and,
instead, received a later model; one which necessitated extensive
rework. This rework again comes back to haunt the government as a
claim and an over -run.
Without arguing either the pros or cons of Mr. vom Baur's
premise there is some evidence that there is more than a grain of
truth in what he has said. In the late 1960's many, if not all of our
shipbuilding and ship conversion projects were characterized by the
claims and massive cost over-runs which he asserts are the inevitable
results of late delivery of GFE, delivery of defective GFE and of
several other factors. While these particular problems are, no doubt,
present in the acquisition process of every major system in which
GFE is an integral part of the program, nowhere does it approach the
problems present in ship projects. Only in a ship project does coordina.
tion of the efforts of so many people in all of the Systems Commands
(SYSCOMS) approach such proportions that a successful interface is a
monumental achievement.
In 1969 the Naval Material Command (NMC), via NAVMAT
Instruction 7000. 14, established the framework for what has since
evolved into the Ship Project Directive (SPD) System. Commander,
Naval Ship Systems Command implemented the system via NAVSHIP5

Instruction 7000.29. For a variety of reasons this instruction has
been modified several times since it was first conceived and the current
version is NAVSHIPS 7000. 29B. A draft version of NAVSHIPS 7000. 29C
is currently being reviewed by the various components of the NMC and
issuance should occur sometime in late 1973.
When initially implemented the instruction required that all Ship
Projects chartered within NAVSHIPS document their transactions with
supporting or participating managers (PARM'S) by SPD's. While this,
quite naturally, resulted in complete compliance, for those projects
whose commitments had already been made the SPD served little more
than an historical record of events transpired. The true potential of
the SPD process could only be realized by those projects which were
still in their definition stage and in which the commitment of funds for
GFE items had not yet occurred.
Because of the rather extended time in which a ship project is
active, those projects which were in their infancy when the SPD system
was implemented are still quite active and hence the success (or
failure) of the system is indeterminable. This is compounded even
further by the many changes which have occurred in the SPD process
itself (two major revisions in the implementing instruction thus far and
a third pending). Thus the true value of the SPD process remains to
be tested. Whether or not it will provide the Ship Acquisition Project
Manager (SHAPM) v/ith the visability of, and control of his items of
GFE is a question which remains to be answered. Further, because of

the many other changes which have occurred during the same time
frame concerning the role of project management and the philosophy
of major weapon systems procurement, the true impact of the SPD
system on ship procurement may never be concisely identifiable.
It is the intent of this research to investigate neither the validity
nor inappropriateness of the SPD process but rather to examine the
views of those who must daily work with it. Our intent has been to
question the implementation of the system and hopefully to offer




The philosophy of Project Management involves the accepted
concept of granting one responsible individual the complete manage-
ment and financial authority necessary to direct the acquisition of a
system. That this concept was not fully observed in Ship Projects in
the 1960's was evidenced by the filing of massive contractor claims,
significant portions of which were directly attributable to mis -manage-
ment of Government Furnished Equipment (GFE): GFE administered
by the various SYSCOMS, and over which the SHAPM had little or no
control.
In recognition of the fact that SHAPM'S were singularly ill-
equipped to control the delivery and quality of their GFE line items the
CHIEF OF NAVAL MATERIAL (CNM) directed, via NAVMAT Instruc-
tion 7000. 14 of 17 April 1969, that COMMANDER, NAVAL SHIP
SYSTEMS COMMAND (COMNAVSHIPS) implement a Ship Project
Directive (SPD) System. It was the intent of CNM that the SPD provide
a means whereby SHAPM'S could direct and control the actions of the
various functional organizations of the NAVAL MATERIAL COMMAND
(NMC) in the performance of SHAPM- required tasks. Implementation
of the SPD system was accomplished within NAVSHIPS by NAVSHIPS
7000. 29 of 5 May 1969. This initial instruction required that the
11

system be implemented for all FY 70 Ship Projects by 1 July 1969 and
that active ship projects for FY 64 through FY 69 be incorporated into
the SPD System by 1 Jan. 1970 or sooner.
The need for some process akin to the SPD System, was pointedly
illustrated by an NMC directed NAVY INDUSTRIAL MANAGEMENT
REVIEW (NIMR) dated Sept. 1969 (Ref. 8) which recommended: "That
efforts be concentrated in the development of contract-like relation-
ships between each SHAPM and secondary manager of GFM and GFI
that emphasize the need to fully define requirements in a timely manner,
to maintain accurate up-to-date status of equipment design and procure-
ment, and to establish bi-directional communications based on mutual
understanding and respect for each other's objectives. "
Just as is the case with any new procedure v/hich is of an
extremely complex nature the initial attempt at implementation of the
SPD process contained many serious short-comings. Recognition of
these deficiencies resulted in the first revision to the process, NAV-
SHIPS 7000. 29A of 3 Feb. 1970. This revised instruction took what
was initially a rather loosely structured requirement and began the
standardization process which has characterized the SPD system ever
since. Specifically it:
(1) established a standardized SPD Part I format.




(3) added the facility for expression of material requirements
for ships of the class in the "out years. "
(4) provided a simplified revision technique.
(5) standardized financial reporting requirements giving
Secondary Managers more freedom in reallocating funds
within the SPD envelope.
To insure that the SPD System was smoothly and effectively
operating, NAVSHIPS directed, in June 1970, that an appraisal of the
SPD System be conducted by SHIPS 01D. This effort spanned the
period 17 June 1970 through 30 Sept. 1970. The appraisal report
(Ref. 1), dated Nov. 1970, and which provided us with much of the
historical background presented herein, contained 41 specific recom-
mendations for improvement of the SPD process. The most signif-
icant result of this appraisal was a second major revision to the
implementing instruction, NAVSHIPS 7000. 29B of 7 April 1972.
It is this latter revision, and the problems associated with
implementing it that we have attempted to address in this report.
In undertaking this research we were unaware that a draft version of
NAVSHIPS 7000.29C was in circulation within the various components
of the NMC for review and comment. While we are in possession of
the draft of NAVSHIPS 7000. 29C our survey has specifically addressed
the problems associated with implementation of NAVSHIPS 7000. 29B.
Hopefully our work will precede the issuance of NAVSHIPS 7000. 29C





To have a true appreciation of the SPD and how it is intended to
work it must be viewed as a contract between the SHAPM and the
PARM. It has, in fact, all those elements which are required to make
a contract a legal, binding document. It represents an agreement
between competent parties for the legal exchange of goods and services
and the element of consideration is present in the form of an administra-
tive assignment of funds from the SHAPM to the PARM.
Besides the contractual aspects of the SPD it also serves as an
historical record of negotiated agreements or transactions between
SHAPM and PARM. Thus the mutual participation of SHAPM and PARM
in the Ship Project can be logically and clearly traced from initiation
of the Project via "unfunded" SPD's through "funded" SPD's to delivery
of the total ship and retirement of the SPD.
The SPD process can, or at least should, establish the vital
communication channel which should exist between SHAPM and PARM.
It formalizes what heretofore was accomplished by less formal, and
hence subject to errors of misinterpretation and omission, means
such as memorandums and letters of agreement. This communication
channel consists of the SPD itself, the reports which the PARM is
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required to provide, and the informal, but supplementary, dialogue
between SHAPM and PARM. It provides the means for the exchange
of information and ideas so vital to the success of a ship project. As
such it can be thought of as part of a management information system
(MIS), a MIS which at present is basically manual but which at some
future time could be automated provided all of the SYSCOMS adopted
a common Automatic Data Processing (ADP) program for tracking
and reporting of their programs.
Participation in the SPD process is mandatory for all activities
within the Naval Material Command (NMC) which are supporting
SHAPMS for work to be performed under all appropriations categories
except RDT&E. The SPD is used for tasking PARMS for both SHAPM-
_
funded and PARM- -funded work. It can be used to task activities out-
side the NMC but only with their concurrence which is presently conveyed
via a joint letter of agreement between the SHAPM and the individual
activity.
The SPD is a rather rigidly formated document consisting of a
transmittal page and three basic parts: (1) Management Direction
(2) Funding and Quantity Direction and (3) Delivery Direction. Because
of the need to manage a single class of ships as a unit it is imperative
that the SPD cover, to the maximum extent practicable, all ships of a
program to be built or converted in order that PARM'S might capitalize
on multi-year options or multi-year contracts.
15

B. PART I MANAGEMENT DIRECTION
Appendix C contains a sample Part I of the SPD. It consists of
seven sections, some of which are broken into sub-sections. Section 1
is an information or background section in which is contained a brief
description of the ship project and justification for the issuance of the
SPD itself.
Section 2 is the action section and consists of five sub-sections:
(1) Management, in which the SHAPM'S desires concerning such areas
as configuration management, data management, security, cost and
schedule management, software appraisal, delegation of authority and
committee and board membership requirements are delineated (2) Ship
System Engineering, in which areas such as quality assurance, risk
management, human engineering and system test and evaluation are
definitized (3) Equipment Engineering/Production Standardization,
which conveys the SHAPM'S program goals with respect to the various
systems engineering disciplines such as reliability, maintainability
and safety (4) Integrated Logistics Support and (5) Special Government
Furnished Information (GFI) Requirements.
Sections 3 thru 6 address, in order, Schedule, Shipping Instructions,
Special Instructions, and Reports.
Finally Section 7 is the Format Guide Statement. Although there is
some leeway as to the wording of this statement it is generally a state-
ment such as: "In preparing the Part I, the SHAPM has reviewed and
16

considered each area of the Format Guide for applicability. Therefore,
any area not cited above is considered not applicable to this SPD. "
While the format itself is rigid, the content is dependent upon the
goals and objectives of the SHAPM, the money he has for those items
which will ultimately require funding and his ability to negotiate an
agreement on each item with the PARM.
C. PART II FUNDING AND QUANTITY DIRECTION
Appendix D to enclosure (1) of NAVSHIPS 7000. 29B illustrates a
sample Part II of the SPD. It presents in a standardized format task/
item descriptions for each item being procured along with the level to
which they are funded, and other funding information and accounting
data.
Each SPD will normally contain more than one Part II. The first
is a current year Part II which addresses the funding for the current
year's quantity of ships, as defined in the FYDP. Out year ships are
addressed in separate Part II's and are for advanced planning purposes
only.
Each line item in the Part II of a funded SPD contains two sets of
fiscal data both of which are expressed to the nearest dollar. The first
is a planning estimate. The second is Current Direction of funds
actually appropriated and available for expenditure. As stated earlier
the SPD is an administrative assignment of funds. Actual transfer of
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funds to the PARM is accomplished by other means, In the case of
NAVAIR and NAVORD the funds are transferred to the PARM by a
Program Funding Authorization (PFA) issued by NAVSHIPS code 10.
For PARM'S within NAVSHIPS, NAVELEX, NAVSUP and NAVSEC,
transfer of funds is accomplished via a work request, NAVCOMP Form
140.
Part II's are priced by line item and all required fiscal reports
will be in reference to the line item. As to what can or should con-
stitute a line item, that is a function of each SYSCOMS' philosophy.
Some SYSCOMS show each piece of hardware and each task as a sep-
arate line item. Others aggregate and report at the systems level and
while showing the components and tasks associated with that system
the price of these components and tasks is not specified.
D. PART III DELIVERY DIRECTION
Appendix E to enclosure (1) of NAVSHIPS 7000. 29B presents a
sample Part III of the SPD. It consists of three separate delivery
schedules: (1) The Government Furnished Equipment (GFE) Delivery
Schedule (2) The Government Furnished Information (GFI) Delivery
Schedule and (3) The Test Support Equipment (TSE) Delivery Schedule.
The same standardized form is used for each of these schedules and
only a check block indicates which it is.
Each of these schedules shows dockside, or equivalent, delivery
dates for each line item of the Part II for each hull. Thus, because
18

it is only the SPD that is binding on the PARM it is absolutely mandatory
that the SPD be issued and accepted prior to award of the shipbuilding
contract. The accepted Part III can quite easily be molded into a
realistic Schedule A (the list of GFE to be provided the shipbuilder
along with delivery dates) to the shipbuilding contract, but the reverse




In undertaking this research our approach consisted of three distinct
phases. The first step was a study of the documentation describing and
implementing the SPD System, an examination of several SPD's currently
active, and a study of an appraisal of the SPD System conducted by the
NAVAL SHIP SYSTEMS COMMAND in 1970. By this means we were
able to identify what we viewed as potential problem areas within the
SPD system.
The second phase consisted of extensive interviews with working
level members of several SHAPM staffs, other NAVSHIPS functional
codes, PARMS within each of the SYSTEMS COMMANDS and the NAVAL
SHIP ENGINEERING CENTER (NAVSEC), and members of the NAVAL
MATERIAL COMMAND (NAVMAT). During these interviews opinions
were solicited regarding the specific problem areas which we had
identified, and other possible problem areas -were brought to our
attention. As a result of these interviews those areas which appeared
to be of most concern with those charged with implementing the SPD
system were identified.
The third stage consisted of addressing the problem areas identified
in a questionnaire for SHAPMS (Appendix A) and a separate, although
similar, questionnaire for PARMS (Appendix B). After contacting all
20

those individuals whose views we desired to solicit the questionnaires
were sent to all except one of the ship projects currently chartered
within NAVSHIPS, one PARM within NAVSHIPS, and the 05 functional
codes of NAVAL AIR SYSTEMS COMMAND (NAVAIR), NAVAL ELECT-
RONIC SYSTEMS COMMAND (NAVELEX), NAVAL ORDNANCE SYS-
TEMS COMMAND (NAVORD), and NAVSEC. Although the questionnaires
did not ask for the level or grade of the respondent, in the case of the
SHAPM'S each was asked, and assented, to review the questionnaire
prior to returning to us.
The DISCUSSION Section of this report addresses each of the eight
areas identified as potential problem areas. In presenting the results
of the survey the SHAPM'S tabulated responses to a particular question
are presented, along with those of their amplifying remarks which give
some insight into their view of the area addressed. This is followed
by the PARM'S tabulated responses to the same or similar question,
along with their amplifying remarks. Statements and opinions expressed
in interviews are interspersed throughout the text and are so identified.
The researchers comments are also clearly identifiable. Conclusions




Before addressing the problem areas which we have examined it
is, in our opinion, important to examine the SHAPM-PARM interface.
When we initially began this research it was our belief that a
PARM was the actual commodity manager within the various SYSCOMS.
Thus we viewed the SPD as a means of establishing the communication
channel between the SHAPM and the Project Manager of a required item
of GFE. Perhaps, in the infancy of the SPD System, this was the case,
but it is no longer true. Currently, a PARM is an administrative
entity which stands between the SHAPM and commodity manager.
Physically, a PARM is a part of the 05 functional code of the various
SYSCOMS. He is a buffer between the SHAPM and the commodity
manager and in all instances he is the SHAPM'S point of contact for
matters pertaining to a Specific SPD. While he relies on the expertise
of the commodity manager and of various other functional codes he is
the negotiator in matters relating to an SPD.
While this might appear as an artificial way of doing business it
affords what we feel are significant advantages. Principal among
these are:
(1) Even though a SHAPM may require several different items
of equipment from a particular SYSCOM he is only dealing
22

with a single individual and so can write a single SPD.
Therefore a SHAPM would only be required to write and
administer approximately a dozen SPD's rather than the
hundred, or more which could result if he was required to
write a single SPD for each item of GFE.
(2) It isolates the small staff of the commodity manager from
the queries of several SHAPM'S who require his product.
At the same time the PARM
,
as he presently exists, can, from a
SHAPM'S viewpoint, be a formidable obstacle. He is, as presently
structured, a potential filter between the SHAPM and the individual who
is actually procuring the SHAPM'S GFE line items. Without question-
ing either the ability or the integrity of the PARM, it is his job to
protect the interests of his SYSCOM and as such it is inevitable that an
adversarial relationship will exist between SHAPM and PARM.
During our interviews one PARM remarked that what was needed
to effectively interface the SHAPMS and PARMS was a coordinating
agency within NAVSHIPS to consolidate SHAPM requirements, assign
priorities to each ship project, and act as a negotiator on behalf of
the SHAPMS in their dealings with PARMS. At the time, and in the
context of that particular interview, it seemed like a reasonable solution
to the SHAPM-PARM interface. In retrospect, however, it would, in
our opinion, constitute a very real erosion of the SHAPM'S authority
and primacy and would inevitably degrade the SHAPM'S ability to
23

perform rather than enhancing his position as a Project Manager charged
v/ith procuring the most complex weapon system procured within the
Department of Defense.
In our opinion, the SPD process was created to give the SHAPM
not only control on his ship project but to bridge the artificial barriers
erected by the SYSCOM charter system as well. In investigating the
SPD system we have attempted to address whether or not these two
objectives have been realized. We were able to identify and investigate
eight significant areas where problems existed. Others were brought to
our attention later and though mentioned in the discussion which follows
insufficient data was available to warrant either detailed discussion
or recommendations by us.
The eight areas which we have addressed constitute areas which
appeared to trouble both SHAPMS and PARMS most. The results we
have presented and the conclusions which we have reached should be
evaluated within the context that perhaps the PARM, as presently
structured, has injected another barrier or constraint into the SPD
process: a constraint that we have not investigated because it was
not recognized early enough to include in our questionnaires.
After presenting our discussion of the eight problem areas, both
general and specific conclusions and recommendations are presented.






One Ship Acquisition Project Manager (SHAPM) has stated
that "PARMS are organized to provide across-the-board sub-systems
and have no real internal management capability on a ship project
basis. " The existence of ship projects in all stages of the acquisition
cycle makes this inability of PARMS to manage on a ship project basis
an interface problem of extraordinary proportions. Coordination of
the individual ship project requirements operating under various stages
of their funding cycles requires an intensive planning effort on the part
of the PARMS if they are to provide their commodities in a timely
manner and at the best possible price.
The need for this planning is tacitly recognized by the NAV-
SHIPS Instruction 7000. 2 QB requirement (Reference (a)), enclosure (1),
para. II Al (C)) that unfunded SPD's (for planning purposes only) be
issued 24 months in advance of the Ship Program Project Year. This
is interpreted to mean the year in which SCN funds are first approp-
riated. By utilizing such a document the PARM, as a commodity
manager, is able to consolidate the total requirements he is required
to fill. Obviously he is unable to execute contracts on the basis of an
unfunded document but he is in a position to incorporate (or at least
try to do so) options into contracts for which he has funds. These
options and their accompanying execution dates can, in turn, be of
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invaluable assistance to the SHAPM in planning for his budget submissions
and his schedule A of the ship building contract. It is the intent, ex-
plicitly stated (Reference (a), enclosure 1 para. IV D2), that all SPD's
be in effect and preferably funded prior to executing a ship building
contract. Only in this way can a realistic Schedule A be incorporated
into the contract and thus the prospect of a constructive change due to
late delivery of GFE minimized. Obviously, then, the unfunded SPD
can serve a vital function and provide a means of minimizing the inter-
face problems inherent in the matrix concept of ship procurement.
The question then becomes "how do those charged with executing the
requirement view it? "
2. Usefulness of the Unfunded SPD
In responding to the question of whether or not the requirement
was realistic and one in which compliance was easily accomplished
(Appendix A, question Al) 8 out of 9 of the SHAPMS answered no. An
equivalent question was not asked of PARMS. In hindsight the question
is, in reality, two questions and therefore only by evaluating the sup-
porting remarks that the SHAPMS have provided do the statistics have
any significance.
One SHAPM has stated that "Too many changes occur prior to
contract award to make an SPD a valid document. " Another has stated
that "Insufficient program data is available at that time to prepare a
useful SPD. " Still another has replied that "a lead ship is generally
26

not that well defined. " Even the one SHAPM who answered the question
in the affirmative qualified his answer with the remark, "This is not
realistic in a new ship program. It can be done with follow- ships in
a class started in previous years. " Comments of the remaining
SHAPMS supported this viewpoint. In only one instance was the excuse
of inadequate staffing that early in a ship program given.
It would seem, then, that the real concern on the part of the
SHAPMS is that they are being asked to document requirements which
are, at best, guesses of final ship configuration. Admittedly, config-
uration changes have been and will continue to be imposed upon them by
higher authority which will affect their program until the final ship
is delivered, but that does not invalidate the need for advance planning.
Obviously, if the SHAPM issues his unfunded SPD's too early and these
are followed by a plethora of configuration changes he will be viewed
as indecisive and the door is open for PARMS to push their pet projects.
A trade-off thus exists between the very real need for early, documented
advance planning via an unfunded SPD, and the proper timing of this
document. Perhaps the proper timing for issuance of the unfunded
SPD should be coupled to the stability of the configuration basline
rather than a seemingly arbitrary date prior to the Ship Program Proj-
ect Year.
In response to the question of whether or not the unfunded
SPD enabled the PARMS to effectively support them (Appendix A,
27

question A2) 5 out of 10 SHAPMS agreed. This apparent dichotomy is
puzzling in view of the responses to question Al indicating the nearly
unanimous belief that the unfunded SPD 24 months prior to the Ship
Program Project Year is an unrealistic requirement because of the
uncertainty of ship configuration. Only by examining the supplementary
remarks can the statistics be put into perspective.
Of those SHAPM'S who agreed with the usefulness of the un-
funded SPD only one provided qualifying remarks. In his words, "In
most cases, however, info from the PARM'S is obtained in sufficient
detail during the preparation of data in support of POM'S. " Without
questioning his motives these researchers find an apparent contradic-
tion in his answer and his supplementary remarks. He appears to be
arguing that while the PARM'S can provide him with the support specifi-
cally stated in the question he has this information from other sources
and therefore the PARMS support in preparing the unfunded SPD is
superfluous.
Those SHAPM'S who disagreed with the usefulness of unfunded
SPD's are more generous with their supplementary remarks and some
interesting issues begin to surface. One SHAPM has stated, "Unfunded
SPD's do serve a useful but that purpose is to permit the PARM to
start his procurement action earlier. " In our opinion that is, at least
in part, what the requirement is all about. Another has remarked that,
"During the period prior to contract award planning activities require
28

coordination with PARM'S. To divert the resources necessary to develop
unfunded SPD's would be detrimental to accomplishment of project
objectives rather than helpful. " A third SHAPM feels, "Just not
required SPD is too vague at this time. " Finally the remark was made
that, "Excluding budget estimates for Schedule "A" GFE, unfunded
SPD's serve no useful purpose in ship acquisition planning. SPD
requirements normally relate to PARM responsible actions after con-
tract award. " This comment is interesting from two standpoints:
(1) the issue of budget estimates being useful since that, in part, is
what the question asked and (2) the statement that SPD requirements
normally relate to PARM responsible actions after contract award.
The issue of engagement/involvement is one that is continually
debated in the Government/Contractor relationship but at least at
present is an accepted principle of government procurement. The
implication of this SHAPM'S remark is that once accepted the SPD is
the PARM'S ball of wax and the SHAPM can move on to more important
matters.
In response to the same question (Appendix B, question Al)
15 out of 16 of the PARMS felt that the unfunded SPD served a useful
purpose. In supporting this view one PARM has stated, "It gets us into
the game early and allows for better planning. It would preclude the
SHAPM from letting a shipbuilding contract that cannot always be
supported by the PARM (i. e. GFE deliveries). " Another felt that,
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"It forces SHAPM to make management decisions early. It may not be
necessary to execute them this early. " Still another remarked that,
"They are also helpful to the PARM for his own acquisition plan. "
Somewhat contradictory another has stated that, "I agree upon 24
months. However unfunded (emphasis added) is questionable. Informa-
tion contained in SAP's and other planning documents often require
support. " As interpreted SCN funds are not available 24 months prior
to the Ship Program Project Year. Further if the planning documents
which this PARM is referring to are ones prepared by headquarters
personnel then they should be funded by that Systems Command's
O & M funds rather than SHAPM'S SCN funds.
The one PARM dissenter as to the usefulness of the unfunded
SPD has remarked, "Planning can be handled through simpler pro-
cedures, e. g. TPOM submissions. This early agreement might be
useful if SHAPM or higher authority wishes to apply MIL-SPECS, etc.
not normally involved. " As viewed by these researchers it is precisely
because of special requirements such as this example, along with the
need for better advanced planning, that the requirement for the unfunded
SPD was established. The NAVSHIPS Appraisal of the SPD System
(Ref. 1) seems to support this view.
Although more definitive conclusions will be presented at the
end of this section it seems appropriate to comment at this time on an
issue which either directly, or indirectly has thus far surfaced.
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SHAPM objections to the unfunded SPD appear to center around unstable
ship configuration baselines 24 months in advance of Programs year
and inadequate staffing. Thus they are being asked to engage in what
might appear a paper-work exercise. As discussed in a previous
section the SPD has evolved into a rather rigidly structured format.
Perhaps a more loosely structured format is appropriate for the
unfunded SPD. A format which can be expanded as requirements
become more firm into the more formal SPD. This idea will be explored
more fully in questions which follow within this section.
3. Level of Detail of the Unfunded SPD
When queried as to how detailed the unfunded SPD should be
written (Appendix A, question A3) 7 out of 10 of the SHAPM'S felt that
it should be written in sufficient detail so that only revisions to Parts II
and III of the SPD would be required to translate it into a viable funded
document. Of those sharing this view one SHAPM commented, "How-
ever, this may not be possible in a new ship program and the unfunded
SPD's may require considerable revision as the program firms up. "
Another stated that this was a valid approach "if this detail is available
in sufficient time. " A third, while agreeing with the question in prin-
ciple doubts that it is possible. Of the remaining SHAPM'S, comments
were either not provided or were somewhat repetitive of the above
statements.
Those SHAPM'S who took the opposing view were unanimous
in their belief that an unstable configuration baseline precluded an
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unfunded SPD being written in any great detail at such an early-
stage.
In response to the same question (Appendix B, question A2)
13 out of 16 of the PARM'S were in agreement with the question as
posed. This agreement as clarified in their remarks, was with a
theoretical principle; in practice it was almost unanimously conceded
that in reality it probably could not be done. Illustrative of this was
the remark by one PARM that: "However the initial requirements
necessary for planning purposes will not contain the level of detail that
later will be necessary. SPD's should be rewritten periodically to insure
a living document. " Providing even more insight was the comment,
"The above statement is an ideal situation. The most serious problems
have been lack of direction from higher authority in sufficient time to
accomplish the intent of the above. "
Those PARMS in disagreement with the question generally
expressed concern over an unstable configuration baseline making
precise detail impractical (seemingly in agreement with those who, at
least in theory felt that precise detail was desirable if not practicable).
One PARM did provide a comment which is of some interest. In his
words "Scope and depth of tasks are a negotiated item totally concerned
and dependent upon funding and cannot be separated from the concept of
giving a ship $X worth of some product. " This statement is included
because in a very obtuse way it addresses what these researchers believe
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is part and parcel of the unfunded SPD's raison d'etre. In the unfunded
SPD the SHAPM is identifying his .requirements. These include, quite
naturally, items of hardware, but they also establish intangibles such
as special studies, unique T & E requirements he wishes to invoke,
special logistics support, and a multitude of other things. At this
point he is interested in determining v/hether or not these requirements
can be met, and at approximately what cost. Who can better provide
him with this information than the PARM, and at least the preponderance
of this information should not require the expenditure of SCN funds.
The entire SPD System is a negotiation process. Issues raised
by the SHAPM'S are frequently taken exception to by the PARM'S.
When queried as to whether or not unfunded SPD's well in advance of
the program year allowed ample time for resolution of these differences
(Appendix A, question A4) 5 out of 9 of the SHAPM'S agreed. As one
of these SHAPM'S so succinctly stated it, "The entire SPD is intended
to resolve any differences between SHAPM tasking and PARM response . "
If this viewpoint can be accepted, and these researchers view it as a
very profound statement, then what is remarkable about this question
is that 44% of the SHAPMS disagreed.
To attempt to shed light on this disagreement it is necessary
to let these SHAPM'S speak for themselves. One has stated, "Excep-
tions must be resolved as program becomes firm. The unfunded SPD
(a piece of paper) does not aid in resolving differences. Again, close
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and continuing association and coordination with PARMS is the answer"
(Isn't this what negotiation and resolution are all about? ). Another has
remarked "Question too vague. What is "Well in advance" 2 weeks,
2 months, 2 years?" A third SHAPM stated, "PMS experience
with unfunded SPD's did not produce the required dialogue to arrive
at mutually acceptable task agreements and relationships. " The fourth
SHAPM disagreed because of the instability of configuration baseline.
In response to the same question (Appendix B, question A3)
13 out of 17 of the PARMS were in agreement with the question as
stated. Again, if one accepted the view that the entire SPD System is
a negotiation process then it is really only germaine to address the
remarks of those PARMS who were in disagreement with the question
as stated. In both instances dollars were cited as the reason for taking
exception. The most succinct statement of this was "until the SPD is
funded not much work will be done. Technical (Engineering) support
is also funded by the SPD. Tasking and reporting requirement excep-
tions do not arise until you actually start doing the work, except
procedural items. " Since this PARM has neglected to provide a
definition of "procedural items" these researchers will take the liberty
of proposing that it is the budget estimates, delivery schedules, and
feasibility of accomplishing specific tasks which the SHAPM is so
vitally interested in during the unfunded stage. The question must




Related to the previous question SHAPM'S were polled as to
whether or not the issuance and acceptance of the funded SPD would
involve a lengthy review process (Appendix A, question A5). In
response 7 out of 9 SHAPMS felt that it would not. Taken in context
with the preceding question the relatively high degree of agreement is
puzzling and unfortunately the SHAPM'S remarks shed no light on this
apparent anomaly. In retrospect perhaps both questions were poorly
worded and hence misunderstood.
The two dissenting SHAPM'S, in support of their answer,
surfaced an issue which, unfortunately was not considered by these
researchers and thus was not addressed in the questionnaire. In the
words of one of these PARM'S, "The issuance and acceptance of
funded SPD's remains a lengthy and time consuming process. This is
due in part to equipment migration from PARM to PARM, and PARM
to ICP, as well as, equipment model and price variations. " In support
of this statement was a remark made during an interview with a SHAPM
which concerned problems that he had experienced when an item of
equipment for which he had an accepted SPD was transferred to another
Systems Command. The significance of his remark was not recognized
by these researchers and as a result what may be a major problem area
(how to stabilize the entire SPD process if the principal players are
continually changing) has not been investigated.
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In responding to this same question (Appendix B, question A4)
10 out of 14 of the PARM'S felt that issuance and acceptance of the
funded SPD would not involve a lengthy review process. Again, because
of their response to the previous question (Appendix B, question A3)
this response is puzzling because of the significant percentage change
between the two questions. Aside from the already admitted possibility
of a poorly worded question, a possible explanation is the concern of
the dissenting PARMS that it is resolution of funding disputes -which
present the major hurdle to any SPD acceptance.
4. Conclusions
In summary, while SHAPMS almost unanimously agreed that
the unfunded SPD was unrealistic and one in which they could easily
comply, the majority felt that it enabled the PARM to better support a
ship project. The reason for this apparent dichotomy is resolved by
the SHAPMS very valid belief that the instability of their configuration
baseline makes compliance extremely difficult. The majority of
PARMS shared the belief that the unfunded SPD enabled them to provide
meaningful support to a SHAPM'S project.
In addressing the level of detail that should be included in the
unfunded SPD, the majority of both SHAPMS agreed that: (1) the unfunded
SPD injected sufficient time into the resolution of major differences to
make a smooth transition into a funded document and (2) the unfunded
SPD should be written in sufficient detail so that transition from an
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unfunded to a funded status should only involve revisions to Parts II
and III of the SPD.
In attempting to interpret the results of this portion of the
survey we have concluded that the unfunded SPD is absolutely essential
to the success of a ship procurement. Although amounts vary greatly
from program to program, in almost all instances the dollar value of
GFE line items represents a significant fraction of total ship cost in
every ship acquisition. Because of the matrix concept of ship procure-
ment this money is spent by other individuals in other Systems Com-
mands and it is only through the SPD System that the SHAPM can
exercise the authority granted him in his charter.
The acquisition of any major weapon system necessarily
involves an intensive planning effort and this is particularly true of
ship procurement because of the need to coordinate the efforts of so
many individuals in many different commands. In the absence of the
SPD process this planning would be accomplished by other means
(memo, letter, telephone, etc. ). What the SPD (and, in particular
the unfunded SPD) brings into the picture is a formalized method of
planning which, while probably not eliminating, will at least serve to
minimize errors of omission.
To argue, as many SHAPM'S have, that an unfunded SPD well
in advance of the Ship Program Project Year is unrealistic because of
an unstable configuration baseline is to argue on one hand that planning
cannot be done until ship design is firm and at the same time to argue
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that an SPD (even an unfunded SPD) is static and inviolate. To accept
the first argument is to imply that neither the SHAPM nor his staff is
required prior to signing of a shipbuilding contract an opinion
which few would accept. To accept the second argument is to mis-
interpret NAVSHIPS 7000. 29B. It implicitly describes the SPD as a
viable, living document which can and must be revised as a program
matures a process which continues until the SPD is finally retired.
To state, as some PARM'S have, that tasks and funding cannot
be separated and therefore the requirement for an unfunded SPD is
unrealistic is to deny the existence of their own expertise. In the unfund-
ed SPD the SHAPM is seeking answers to the questions: (1) Is this task
feasible? (2) How much will it cost? (3) Can these delivery schedules
be met? (4) What risks are involved in this course of action? (5) What
are my alternatives? (6) What are my trade-offs? (7) What are my long
leadtime items? The various Systems Commands Headquarters
personnel are, or at least should be, singularly equipped to provide
him with the answers, and the efforts of these experts are funded
by that Systems Command's O & M funds. In those few instances
where outside assistance is required to answer the question(s) it will
go unanswered until the SHAPM provides funding, but this merely
serves to highlight the need for an unfunded SPD as early as possible
(and 24 months is not a firm requirement only a preferred time).
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As to the level of detail of the unfunded SPD, it should be as
detailed as is absolutely feasible. If it is viewed as a "living document"
then changes can be expected but that does not mean that the initial doc-
ument should be a piece of paper submitted solely to satisfy a require-
ment. Rather it should be the first step in establishing the two-way
communications link 'which is absolutely essential in a well-managed
program.
B. ISSUANCE AND ACCEPTANCE OF THE SPD
1. General
The controls imposed on the issuance and acceptance procedures
for the SPD are rather rigidly defined in NAVSHIPS 7000. 29B. Very
briefly these controls address: (1) Acceptance of the SPD, (2) rejection
of the SPD and (3) resolution of disagreements.
Commencing with the date of issuance of the SPD the PARM has
21 calendar days in which to review the SPD, accept it in its entirety,
accept it with minor reservations which are specifically noted, or reject
it with a letter detailing the reasons for rejection. Recognizing that the
complexity of some SPD's may require additional time for review, an
additional 21 calendar days may be provided but this is solely at the
discretion of the SHAPM.
When PARM'S disagree on points within the SPD which both
SHAPM and PARM consider minor, the PARM should sign the SPD
making specific note of areas of disagreement. Resolution of these
minor differences should occur within 15 days.
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In those instances where a PARM must take major exception
to an SPD he should return it unsigned along with a letter specifying
his reasons for rejection. Even though the PARM may have rejected
the SPD it is essential to the proper functioning of the SPD process
that he immediately initiate those procurement and management actions
which are required, but he will not be held responsible for time or cost
schedules to which he has not agreed. Just as with the case of the minor
exception, the SHAPM and PARM should make every effort to resolve
their disagreement within 15 calendar days of rejection.
In those instances where resolution of a disagreement cannot be
resolved by the SHAPM and PARM within 15 calendar days of the original
rejection the SPD instruction requires that the matter be brought to the
attention of a higher authority. For certain Ship Projects the next higher
authority is a CNM - designated PM who exercises Ship Manager respon-
sibilities through one or more SHAPM'S. In the case of disagreements
referred to these PM's they may either direct a resolution or delegate
the resolution to COMNAVSHIPS. In those cases where a CNM - des-
ignated PM does not exercise managerial control over the SHAPM the
disagreement would be referred directly to COMNAVSHIPS.
Decisions made by either a CNM - designated PM or by COM-
NAVSHIPS are final and binding on both SHAPM and PARM unless either
one files an appeal within 5 days of the decision. In these instances the
matter would be referred to CNM for final resolution.
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2. The 21 Day Review Period
When asked if 2 1 days is a sufficient length of time for the
PARM to review an SPD (Appendix A, question Bl) 7 out of 9 SHAPM'S
felt that it was. In supporting this belief one SHAPM qualified his an-
swer by stating: "In most cases. Several have taken longer due to their
size, complexity and amount of people required to review it. " We feel
that this qualification is particularly apropos since many SPD's are
large and complex - in one case cited by a PARM an SPD was issued
which was 273 pages long. Further, the PARM will solicit the expertise
of many functional codes within his SYSCOM to intelligently review,
evaluate and comment on the content of an SPD. Another SHAPM has
commented: "Time frame is sufficient, however many SPD's issued by
PMS - have not been accepted by the PARM until well after the 21 day
deadline. " No other comments were provided.
Of those SHAPMS who felt that 21 days was not sufficient only
one provided an amplifying remark and it was his belief that 45 days
would be more realistic. This is, of course, close to the 42 days
allowable if the SHAPM judiciously utilizes the 21 day extension option
which he alone controls.
When PARMS were asked the same question (Appendix B,
question Bl) 11 out of 15 felt that the time was sufficient. One PARM
who shared this belief commented: "The 21 days should be 21 working
days, not calendar days, from receipt of the SPD (should be same date
indicated on SPD if all are hand carried vice mailed). " This response
illustrates two points. Although NAVSHIPS 7000. 29B clearly specifies
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21 calendar days from date of issue, our question did not and hence is a
classic example of poor polling technique. Secondly, the issue of hand
delivery vice mail takes on significant meaning when one considers that
mail can take up to 8 days (as revealed in several of our interviews) to
travel between SYSCOMS. Another PARM has stated: "Delays are not
due to lack of time but lack of attention on the part of those with authority
to make decisions. " Any conclusions which we might reach concerning
this comment would be speculative but it certainly appears highly critical
of his own organization. A third PARM qualified his answer by remark-
ing: "Only if PARM is a participating party in its (SPD) preparation."
In our opinion this comment broaches certain of the issues involved in the
unfunded SPD previously discussed and the requirement for standardized
tasks to be addressed to in a later section. It is our belief that PARM'S
should be participants in the SPD preparation and further that NAVSHIPS
7000. 29B encourages this.
Those PARM'S who felt that 21 days was inadequate were gen-
erally in accord in their belief that the specification of calendar days
made the requirement unrealistic. This view was best expressed by the
statement: "In the first place 21 days in 7000. 29B means 21 calendar
days, vice workdays, from SHAPM time of signature - not necessarily
receipt of the SPD by PARM. 21 actual in-house working days should be
sufficient. "
3. Resolution of Minor Differences
When SHAPM'S were queried as to whether or not in their
experience 15 days was adequate time to resolve minor differences
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(Appendix A question B2) 7 out of 8 felt that it was. None of these
SHAPMS provided amplifying remarks.
When asked the same question (Appendix B, question B2) 15 out
of 17 PARMS indicated that 15 days was adequate. Of these 15 only 2
PARM'S provided amplifying remarks. The first qualified his answer by
stating: "There are always exceptions. What is minor to one party may
be major to another. " The second PARM remarked that: "This has been
done in 2 days including signatures. 15 days are more than enough. "
Of the 2 PARM'S whose experience indicated 15 days was
insufficient only one provided a comment. His remark was: "Some-
times minor items are harder to resolve than major items. "
In view of the near unanimity of both SHAPM'S and PARMS that
15 days is sufficient to resolve minor differences we began to wonder
why we even considered this as a possible problem area. During our
interviews this issue was repeatedly raised, however, and in one case
an SPD was found to have taken several months to resolve. In the mys-
tical world of modern physics there is a phenomena known as time dila-
tion. Perhaps it has been at work 'twixt interviews and questionnaires.
4. Resolution of Major Exceptions
In order to gain some insight into how common of an occurrence
the major exception to an SPD was SHAPM'S were polled as to the
number of SPD's they had issued, and how many were originally rejected
for major exceptions. Those SHAPM'S who responded to the question
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were currently administering a total of 283 SPD's of which 12 were
originally rejected.
When queried as to the level at which resolution occurred
SHAPM'S responded by indicating that 1 1 of those rejected were
resolved at the PARM - SHAPM/PM level and one remained un-
resolved. When PARM'S were asked this same question they indicated
that with the exception of 1 SPD which was still unresolved and 1 which
was resolved by COMNAVSHIPS all were resolved at the PARM _
SHAPM/PM level. The fact that one PARM indicated that 1 SPD was
resolved by COMNAVSHIPS should not necessarily be viewed as con-
tradictory to the SHAPM'S response since not all SHAPM'S provided
their statistics. We do find it particularly bothersome that an SPD
exception which was resolved at the CNM level during the period we
were conducting our interviews was not reported by either SHAPM or
PARM.
That nearly all major exceptions are resolved at the PARM -
SHAPM/PM level is not, in our opinion, surprising. During our inter-
views it was repeatedly brought to our attention that the requirement
that the SHAPM take disagreements to higher authority if they could
not be resolved in 15 days necessarily involves the SHAPM putting
himself "on report. " Whether or not this premise was true was
addressed indirectly by asking both SHAPM'S and PARMS how long
it took to resolve a major exception.
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Of the 7 SHAPM'S who responded to the question of how long
it takes to resolve a major exception 3 said less than 2 months, 3 said
from 2 to 4 months, and 1 indicated that it took longer than 4 months.
Of the 11 PARM'S who responded to the question 2 said that it took
less than 2 months, 3 said it took from 2 to 4 months, and 6 indicated
that it required in excess of 4 months for resolution. While it may be
statistically unsound to draw any sweeping conclusion from these
responses we do feel that there is enough of a correlation between the
SHAPM'S and PARM'S responses to infer that many of the major ex-
ceptions require more than 2 months for resolution. This coupled
with the fact that nearly all major exceptions are resolved at the
PARM - SHAPM/PM level would appear to indicate an extreme
reluctance on the part of SHAPMS to refer exceptions to higher auth-
ority. Further, since NAVSHIPS 7000. 29B allows the PARM to refer
unresolved difficulties directly to COMNAVSHIPS at any time, provided
the SHAPM is first notified, would seem to indicate that they are
either (1) reluctant to accept resolutions dictated by COMNAVSHIPS
or (2) they are using the SHAPMS reluctance to put himself "on report"
and this administrative lever to extract concessions which they might
not otherwise expect. That this latter might at least be partially true
is indicated by one SHAPMS statement that: "After contract award it
took approximately six months to negotiate acceptable SPD's with the
PARM'S since the project required less support than the PARMS
thought they should provide. "
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The issue of referring a major exception to higher authority-
was also approached more directly by asking both SHAPMS and PARMS
if the SHAPM should automatically report to higher authority if a
SHAPM - PARM resolution cannot be achieved in 15 days. In response
6 out of 10 SHAPM'S felt that he should, whereas 13 out of 17 PARM'S
felt that the SHAPM should. These responses seem completely at
odds with what they have reported has occurred in the past. As
presently structured the entire SPD process is a continual learning
process. There is no formal training program to indoctrinate the
newly-formed staffs of the various pitfalls present in the system.
Perhaps the responses to this question are tacit recognition that what
has transpired in the past has been wrong. If this is the case then
hopefully this information will be conveyed to future Ship Project
staffs.
5. Conclusions
Although the majority of both SHAPM'S and PARM'S indicated
that 21 calendar day's from date of issue was ample time for a PARM
to review an SPD it is our feeling that it is not. This opinion is based
on what we have seen, what we have been told in interviews, and is
further supported by those SHAPM'S and PARM'S who expressed the
minority view. Even assuming same day delivery of an SPD from
SHAPM to PARM, 21 calendar days translates into, at most, 15
working days. While there exist SPD's of such simplicity that review
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could be accomplished with 15 working days the majority of SPD's are
of such a complex nature that it is our opinion that a thorough review
of the SPD cannot be accomplished in this brief time. Even assuming
an extensive SHAPM - PARM team relationship in initially negotiating
the substance of an SPD there is no evidence that the issued SPD
receives anything other than a very detailed examination by the PARM.
During the course of our research we were able to document
the chronology of several SPD's during the issuance - acceptance
phase, which lend some credence to our belief that this phase is not
as rosey as both SHAPM'S and PARM'S have indicated. The following
example, while perhaps an extreme case, is at least representative
of what we believe is more commonplace than has been reported.
1. SPD issued 21 Sept. 197
_.
2. SPD rejected and returned 17 Nov. 197 .
3. SPD returned to PARM 2 3 April 197_.
4. SPD conditionally accepted 14 May 197 .
Nearly 8 months from issuance to a conditional acceptance,
and resolution was negotiated at the SHAPM - PARM level.
It is our opinion that the 21 calendar days for review is, in
most instances, inadequate. We recognize that calendar days from
issuance is necessary for the SHAPM to track the progress of his
SPD's but feel that 30 days would be a more realistic period. The
21 day extension is still appropriate in some instances but it is our
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opinion that the PARM should have more latitude in requesting it.
Perhaps it should be automatically granted if requested, in writing,
anytime prior to 15 calendar days after issuance. While this may
seem a rather arbitrary cut-off date we view it as a more than ample
period in which the PARM could make a detailed examination of the
SPD to determine, in his view, the complexity of the issues involved
in the document. Because of the flexibility this requirement would
grant to the PARMS we feel that the SHAPM can and must enforce the
review period (30 calendar days or, in the case of an extension, 51
calendar days). Therefore we would support a mandatory requirement
that all cases of non-compliance be referred by the SHAPM to a higher
authority.
In spite of the nearly unanimous view of both SHAPM'S and
PARM'S that the SHAPM should automatically seek resolution, from
higher authority, of issues which the SHAPM and PARM cannot
resolve, their responses also indicate that they have not observed
this principle in the past. While we are viewing this requirement
from the rather sterile atmosphere of the academic environment we
cannot attach any stigma to strict compliance with the requirement
(i.e. - SHAPM putting himself on report). Protracted negotiations
of exceptions are, in our opinion, self-defeating because:
1. They ultimately degenerate into a contest of wills with
the actual issues becoming secondary.
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2. They promote an adversarial relationship between the
SHAPM and PARM which will continue throughout the life
of the Ship Project - an adversarial relationship which
cannot help but be detrimental to the goals of both SHAPM
and PARM.
3. They re-enforce the sometimes arbitrary barriers
erected by the SYSCOM charter system: barriers which
the SPD process is designed to cross.
C. STANDARDIZED TASKS
1. General
Although DOD Instruction 5000. 1 and various other instructions
stress the importance of placing our best people in positions of project
management and giving them the authority to pursue their assigned
tasks in a manner which they deem best, it is recognized that some
constraints must be placed on their actions. Hopefully these constraints
would not be intended to restrict the initiative of our Project Managers,
(PM) but rather to make their jobs easier and to inject a degree of
standardization into an arena which would be a potential Pandora's
box if each PM were allowed to make his own rules.
In the case of the SPD process the SHAPM endeavors to convey
his goals, his aspirations, his objectives via a written document which,
no matter how well written, is subject to various interpretations.
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Preparation of the document is time-consuming for the SHAPM.
Review of the document by the PARM is also time-consuming. Accept-
ance is subject to a discussion of semantics and intent and the final
document may, in the end, be a product which is not really acceptable
to either SHAPM or PARM.
While it is recognized that a SHAPM must have some leeway
in structuring his GFE requirements to fit his particular project it
is also recognized that certain tasks are subject to standardization.
Thus NAVSHIPS 7000. 29B requires that PARMS develop a list of
standard jobs and task elements with adequate descriptions and that
these lists be forwarded to NAVSHIPS code 051 for consolidation. In
this way it is envisioned that some degree of uniformity can be brought
to the SPD process, the mechanics of SPD preparation can be simplified,
and at least part of the process can be subjected to a common language
acceptable to all.
The requirement is clear and not subject to interpretation,
so the questions then became: (1) Do the lists exist? and (2) are
they of any value?
2. Existence of Standardized Tasks
When asked if a list of standardized tasks existed (Appendix A,
question CI) 9 out of 10 SHAPM'S felt that it did not. The one SHAPM
that said that it did exist qualified his answer by stating "One PARM
has developed such a list. " When the questionnaire was initially
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prepared this nearly unanimous belief that such a list did not exist
was totally unanticipated and hence SHAPM'S were further asked if
they had utilized it (Appendix A, question C2) and if they found it useful
(Appendix A, question C3). In view of their response to the first ques-
tion it is not surprising that all answered no to both of these questions.
When asked if they had complied with the requirement (Appen-
dix B, question CI) 4 out of 14 PARMS said that they had. All four
were in the same Systems Command and so it appears that at least
one PARM has made an attempt to comply with the requirement and
one SHAPM has, at least, recognized their efforts even if he did not
use the list. The comments of these PARM'S do provide some interest-
ing commentary. "It is not current - even if it was, NAVSHIPS does
not comply with it anyway. " We are uncertain as to what was intended
by this statement but the implication - seems to be that either NAV-
SHIPS 051 is not maintaining the file or the SHAPM'S are not utilizing
it. "The requirement was satisfied but is not current now. Actually
SYSCOM charter should suffice. SHAPM'S wouldn't pay attention to
them either. " "The NAV- -- /NAVSHIPS Interface Task Groups have
accomplished this requirement to a degree that only minimal effort is
required in most instances to resolve inadequacies. " This idea is
explored in greater detail in a later section but it is our impression
that this particular requirement is not one with which the Interface
Task Group should be concerned.
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3. The Usefulness of Standardized Tasks
In response to the question of whether or not a file of standard-
ized tasks would be beneficial (Appendix A, question C4) 6 out of 9
SHAPMS felt that it would. One of those who felt that it would qualified
his answer by stating, "As long as the list was not entirely parochial
to the detriment of the SHAPMS responsibility. " Still another SHAPM
remarked, "Standard NAVSHIPS/PARM negotiated tasks would result
in across-the-board SHAPM SPD uniformity. " We find this comment
particularly interesting since it is indicative of a trend (uniformity)
which prevails throughout the evolution of the SPD process. Each
succeeding revision of the instruction has attempted to inject more
and more uniformity into the process. In the areas which have been
standardized thus far (Reports, standard tasks, financial accounting
systems) we feel that the advantages to be gained by uniformity far
outweigh the disadvantages. Thus, although uniformity necessarily
restricts the initiative of the individual SHAPM it makes the SPD
process itself a more viable system and one less subject to parochial-
ism on the part of SHAPM and PARM.
Of those SHAPM'S who felt the file of standardized tasks
would not be useful only one provided amplifying remarks. His remark,
while not necessarily germaine to the issue being addressed does pro-
vide an interesting commentary of what one SHAPM views as the
proper SHAPM-PARM relationship. "It is not the SHAPM'S task to
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determine what the PARM can do and how organized; it is the SHAPM'S
task to specify the support required and the PARM'S task to determine
how it can best provide the required support. " By requiring, as
NAVSHIPS 7000. 29B does, that PARM'S develop the list of standard-
ized tasks, we feel that this SHAPM'S philosophy is being observed.
Hence we see no encroachment by the SHAPM'S into arenas which are
justifiably those of the PARM. We do question his implication, as we
interpret his statement, that SHAPM shouldn't even care what the tasks
are. This would, in essence, grant total freedom of discretion to the
PARM and would inevitably defeat the entire purpose of the SPD process.
We do feel, however, that this SHAPM has addressed an area which,
in interviews and in their responses to the questionnaire, PARM'S
have indicated is one of their major concerns. At what point in the
SHAPM- PARM interface do the actions of the SHAPM impinge upon
the authority and responsibility of the PARM?
When queried as to the usefulness of the file (Appendix B,
question C2) 6 out of 14 PARM'S felt that it was useful. In supporting
this viewpoint one PARM remarked: "It further standardizes and
insures all parties understand certain basics. " We are in accord
with this PARM'S belief and feel that this, at least in part, is the




Of those PARM'S opposed to the file one has stated: "It would
be time consuming to prepare and maintain in accordance with each
SHAPM'S requirements. " We agree that it would be time consuming
to prepare but feel that it is not intended to be maintained in accord-
ance with individual SHAPM'S requirements. Rather it is a starting
point for the SHAPM, in preparing his SPD's. He may incorporate
the task as written, modify it subject to negotiation, or reject it com-
pletely and write his own requirement, again subject to negotiation.
Another has commented: "SHAPM'S are either not aware of their
existence or want to do things differently. If the task is standard it
should be part of the command charter and unnecessary to re-iterate
in the SPD. " This PARM is one of those previously identified as
having to some degree complied with the requirement and so is prob-
ably justified in his belief that SHAPM'S are either unaware of the file
or want to do things differently. As to his latter comment that standard
tasks should be part of the command's charter we feel that this is a
totally unrealistic position. If incorporated into command charters
the task would become so inflexible that no one could live with it.
Another has stated that: "05 should develop a standard SPD which
SHAPM and PARM can modify to suit particular program. " Since he
did not identify which command's 05 code he was referring to we
assume he means NAVSHIPS. This has been done and is currently
called NAVSHIPS 7000. Z9B. There is a standard SPD and it is modi-
fied to accommodate a particular program.
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Interestingly several of the PARMS who opposed the file
responded with comments such as: (1) "I didn't know it existed",
(2) "I know of no such requirement" and (3) "Lacking specific info on
requirement and its purpose, my immediate reaction is no. " In our
opinion this is indicative that at least some PARM'S are not as familiar
with the SPD instruction as they should be. If it were just this one
issue that were involved then their lack of knowledge of the file require-
ment would be a rather minor point. We must wonder, however, if
there are other areas of the instruction with which they are unfamiliar.
4. Conclusions
From our survey it is obvious that for all practical purposes
a file of standardized tasks does not exist. As to whether or not it
would serve a useful purpose the majority of SHAPM'S felt it would
whereas the majority of PARM'S felt that it would not. That the
majority of SHAPM'S should share this belief is, in our opinion,
indicative of the importance which they attach to the PARM'S advice
and participation in the preparation of the SPD. That the majority of
PARM'S oppose the file is, in our opinion, a needless sacrifice of a
potentially valuable advisory role in order to avoid the vast amount of
work involved in preparing the file. Perhaps this is an over-simplifica.
tion and other forces are at work but with the data available to us this
is the only conclusion we can draw.
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Obviously preparation of a file of standard tasks would be a
time consuming process but we feel that the outcome of such an
endeavor to be well worth the effort. The file should not be binding
but, rather, should serve as a starting point from which to structure
a particular Ship Program. PARM'S would provide a valuable input
into the preparation of SPD's an input which many have indicated
they do not now have.
Standardized tasks, if well-conceived and well-prepared,
would give PARM'S a greater say in the document which they ultimately
must accept and comply with. Further, it should reduce the length and
complexity of the SPD and minimize areas which are subject to seman-
tic interpretation. Thus the file of standardized tasks would bring the
PARM into the SPD process early, give him a negotiating position
from which to start and reduce the time and effort required to review
and accept the issued SPD.
As long as standardized tasks are viewed as a starting position
and not a binding constraint they, in no way, impinge upon the SHAPM'S
managerial discretion in structuring his program. Because of the
matrix concept of project management the SHAPM has to view his
PARM'S as part of his staff and seek out their advice. The file of
standard tasks is but one source of information so vital to his program's





SPD's are vital to assure that SHAPM requirements, perform-
ance delivering dates and costs are acceptable to both parties. Certain
key operations in the SPD system require control and status reporting
not only to indicate task progress, but also to identify and document
a need for a task change and a basis for that change's execution.
Reporting requirements for the SPD system are established in NAV_
SHIPS INST 7000. 29B and are outlined below. An example of each
report with instruction is included in Appendix D, E and F, respectively.
(1) Financial Reporting. The SPD Financial Report is main-
tained by the applicable PARM and copies forwarded to the cognizant
SHAPM on a monthly basis. The first report is submitted to the
SHAPM within 60 days after assignment to the PARM of the program's
Current Direction Dollars. Subsequent reports are provided by the third
working day of each month for the preceding month. After all obligating
transactions have been effected for all Part II line items in the SPD,
financial reporting will be reduced to an exception basis until final
close-out of the SPD.
(2) Quarterly Government Furnished Material (GFM) Status
Report. The SPD GFM Status Report is maintained by the applicable
PARM and copies forwarded on a quarterly basis to the cognizant
SHAPM. The purpose of this report is to provide detailed information
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for each SPD Part III item, i. e, the Government Furnished Equipment
(GFE) Delivery Schedule. It is broken down by each ship's hull number
and provides information concerning the type of procurement prepared,
the dockside delivery date of the item, the date of contract award for
the item, the type and date of action in the sequence of acquisition
which last occurred and that which is planned to occur next. The first
report is submitted within 90 days after the acceptance of the SPD by
the PARM. Subsequent reports are submitted by the third working day
of the month following the quarter being reported.
(3) Monthly Government Furnished Material (GFM) Status
Variance Report. The SPD GFM Status Variance Report is maintained
by the applicable PARM and copies forwarded on a monthly basis to
the cognizant SHAPM. This report is designed to provide variances
and detailed information for variances on a monthly basis to the latest
Quarterly GFM Status Report. In the absence of any variance a
written statement that no variance has occurred is issued.
These requirements are set forth in order to maintain con-
sistent and compatible reporting procedures. Deviation from them
must be agreed upon (as outlined in NAVSHIPS INST 7000. 29B) by the
SHAPM and PARM concerned or by NAVSHIPS and the PARM concerned.
The latter agreement between NAVSHIPS and the PARM would appear
to be degrading the authority of the SHAPM, if, in fact, NAVSHIPS
were to make this decision with the PARM.
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At present there is disagreement among SHAPM's and
PARM's over the requirements levied by NAVSHIPS INST 7000. 29B.
Some PARM's object to the detailed reporting requirements written
into SPD's and the depth of monitoring planned by some SHAPM's.
Some SHAPM's, on the other hand, feel they have the authority to
require detailed reporting and the responsibility for maintaining the
progress of the PARM's contributions to the Ship Acquisition Project.
2. Submission
As a result of both questionnaire and personal interviews
with various SHAPM's and PARM's, it was determined all of the
responding PARM's (15 out of 15) considered that the required reports,
in the format and at the time intervals specified, were being submitted
to the SHAPM's. On the other hand, only 2 out of 8 SHAPM's felt that
these reports submitted by the PARM's were in proper format and on
time. One SHAPM felt that it was "yes in some cases and no in other
cases". Another SHAPM specifically addressed the reporting format
by stating that "standard reporting formats are not being used by all
PARM's". Although all of the PARM's queried submitted a "yes" to
the question (Appendix B, question Dl), it must be qualified that not
all the reports sent by the PARM's are in the specified format. For
example, one PARM answered "yes" stating, "The NAVORD PPG
(Planned Procurement Guide) Variance Report, though not in the
format specified by some SHAPM's, is providing accurate exception
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reports and is acceptable to all the SHAPM's. " Yet another PAB.M
answered "yes" to the same question with a stated response of "Reports
are not, however, in accordance with NAVSHIPS INST 7000. 29B. "
Another PARM gave a "yes" answer while stating, "Those reports
that has agreed to are: (1) Quarterly Material Progress-
ing and (2) Monthly Financial. "
As long as this type of varied reporting exists the established
goal of providing a uniform reporting system will never be reached.
It is the feeling of the researchers that the reporting criteria estab-
lished in NAVSHIPS INST. 7000. 29B must be enforced by the various
SYSCOMS or the instruction criteria be changed to meet the needs of
the system. In the advent of the proposed NAVSHIPS INST. 7000. 29C
the Integrated Financial Management Information System (IFMIS) will
hopefully eliminate the problem of varied reporting systems within
the Naval Material Command. IFMIS will provide direction for a
unified SYSCOM reporting system. It includes implementation of a
Navy-wide Integrated Accounting System (IAS) and a Procurement
Accounting and Reporting Subsystem (PARS). PARS will be the single
source of SCN financial data and is scheduled to be fully operational
by 1 July 1974.
The Integrated Financial Management System (IFMS) Project
was established to consolidate financial management information at
various summary levels, inhibit the limitation of summary reporting
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of fiduciary financial information, inhibit an overlapping of current
systems and to prevent proliferation of memorandum records. There
are presently five independent Financial Status Reporting Systems that
are in use by the Navy today for reporting SCN financial data. They
are: (1) Appropriation Accounting System which includes reporting to
NAVCOMPT to satisfy the mandatory external appropriation reporting
requirements to Treasury and OMB, (2) NAVSHIPS Accounting System
(727) which includes fund status reporting to meet NAVSHIPS and higher
management information requirements, (3) NAVAIR/NAVORD Procure-
ment Appropriation Accounting System, (4) SPD System which includes
fund status reporting requirements of the SHAPM's at a lower level of
detail than provided for in the NAVSHIPS Accounting System (727) and
(5) DD1416 "Report of Programs" on the status of budget program
values to meet management information requirements of SECNAV,
OPNAV, DOD, OMB, and Congress. All of these will be incorporated
into one Accounting and Reporting System (PARS).
3. Visibility
SHAPM's were queried as to the visibility of their GFE as
provided them by the present reporting system. (Appendix A, Question
D2). Of the eight responses received on this question, six felt that
it did not provide them with adequate visibility of their GFE status.
Of the two "yes" responses one SHAPM felt that the visibility was
adequate from a "financial standpoint" only. In looking at those that
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felt it wasn't adequate, one SHAPM believed that "monthly reporting
vice quarterly reporting is required for adequate visibility of GFE
(except financial reporting which is monthly)". This statement appears
to overlook the monthly Variance Status Report which updates the
quarterly GFM status report. Another SHAPM stated, "The reporting
requirements are not in enough detail to give him adequate visibility".
One SHAPM pointed out that "contract problems and risk elements are
not provided by the present GFM status reports". In contrast to the
instructions laid forth in NAVSHIPS INST 7000. 29B, one SHAPM
reported that "the system doesn't work until the ship is actually under
contract". In both NAVELEX and NAVSEC the status reporting is by
a "mechanized reporting system". They do not start their reporting
procedures until the Lead Ship contract is let so the SHAPM must find
some means to go around the system in advance of this time. This is
especially true in the Patrol Frigate Program where the Land Based
Test Sites (LBTS) govern the schedule. Again, additional and varied
reports come forth.
4. Leeway in Reporting
Although PARM's can comply with the existing reporting
requirements, many of them would prefer more leeway in submitting
them. In response to the question of whether or not they would prefer
more leeway in submitting required reports, (Appendix B, question D3)
8 out of 15 acknowledged that they would. Two PARM's replied that
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"they would like to report on an exception basis". One PAR.M stated
that "the instruction should have the flexibility to allow substitution
of currently generated reports (by PARMS) which fit the needs of the
SHAPM. One PARM indicated " has many established reporting
systems including computerized reporting-reformating to meet the
SHAPM's personal wishes is assinine". Another PARM believes that
"set procedures should be established for all SHAPMS and all PARMS".
The researchers agree with this theory. A variation of reporting
systems, as indicated by one PARM does not constitute a viable,
productive reporting system.
In asking the SHAPMS if they preferred more leeway in estab-
lishing their own reporting requirements, (Appendix A, question D3)
5 out of 9 indicated that they would. One SHAPM responded with a
yes to this question and stated "to the extent that PARMS would indicate
in their Financial Reports those SPD Part II Line Items for which all
procurement actions have taken place and excess obligation authority
may be recovered by SHAPM. " Another SHAPM responded "yes"
but added; "However, if SHAPM's had more leeway, the result would
no doubt be reflected in a lack of standardization of reports and
formats". One of the SHAPM's that responded "No" to the question
allowed that the "capability exists for additional reporting but the
timing (sic) must be established according to needs of the individual





As indicated above, it is evident that there is a varied concern
over the leeway in establishing and submitting reporting requirements.
The question was asked of the PARM's if the present reporting require-
i
ments in any way constitute "over- control" by the SHAPM. (Appendix B,
question D2). Of those responding 9 out of 16 answered "yes". One
PARM indicated that "SYSCOMS should be tasked to do a project -
not how to do it. If exception reports only were required they should
suffice and save dollars". Another PARM indicated "yes" stating
that "some reports are in addition to standard reporting systems
already in . " Still another indicated "yes" stating that it
is "largely true that submits reports that were available at
the time SPD was established. The Command has so far successfully
resisted the submission of additional reports".
In the proposed NAVSHIPS INST. 7000. 29C additional reporting
requirements are levied on the PARM's. These additional reports are
Government Furnished Information (GFI) Quarterly Status Reports and
Government Furnished Information (GFI) Monthly Status Variance
Reports. This brought up the question to both SHAPM and PARM
"would additional reporting requirements constitute "over-control"
of the PARM's program (Appendix A, B, question D4)? Nine out of
twelve PARM's responded "yes", while 6 out of 8 SHAPM's responded
"No". Of the SHAPM's responding with a "No" answer to the question,
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only three expressed an opinion. One stated "it would give the SHAPM,
however, a more timely capability to make decisions if changes are
required". Another stated "No, if it is practical to obtain the informa-
tion", while the third SHAPM felt that "reporting requirements do not
constitute control". The one SHAPM that gave a remark with a "yes"
answer felt that "PARM's are geared to manage the technical logistic
aspects of Government controlled equipment, SHAPM's should not
dictate how these functions are to be managed".
Two of the PARMs responding with a "yes" to the question
of over- control felt that it would depend on the type of report. In
interpreting their response, we looked upon their statement as a
double implication. If the report was of a necessity then it would not
be over-control, whereas it would be if it were considered to be a
routine report. One PARM answering "No" felt that it would not be
"over-control" if "additional data were judiciously chosen".
6. Conclusion
Although the reporting requirements are established in NAV.
SHIPS INST 7000. 29B, our research indicates that it is evident these
procedures are not being uniformly used on a command wide basis.
It is apparent that each SYSCOM has its own reporting system and
there is a strong resistance in changing to those reporting systems
called for in the instruction. Although the advent of IFMS will hope-
fully give some stability to the use of the Financial Reporting System,
65

the other reporting requirements will apparently struggle along behind
unless there is some effort made on the part of the System Commanders
to effectively enforce the requirements set forth in the existing
instruction.
One of the main purposes of the reporting requirements is to
provide the SHAPM with adequate visibility of his GFE. It is evident
from the questionnaire results that many of the SHAPMS feel this
visibility isn't being provided. It is hard to distinguish whether this
problem is dtie to the information requested by the reports or the varia-
tion of the reports by the various PARMS. In our research of the
information requested by the reports, it appears to be complete and
should give the SHAPM the information he would need. Any outside
considerations, such as contract problems, should be provided to
the SHAPM by direct liaison. We feel that the timing of the reports
is adequate to meet the SHAPM's needs. The Financial Status Report
is on a monthly basis and this should be sufficient. The Material Status
Report is quarterly, but it is enhanced by a monthly Variance Report
that is again sufficient to indicate any real or potential problem areas.
While additional reporting requirements may or may not create over-
control responses on the part of the PARM it would, most likely, create
another undesirable need for added paper work. This is not to say that
the GFI report requirements that are proposed in the up-coming NAV.
SHIPS INST 7000. 29C are not needed however. We feel that the
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requirement of breaking GFI out from GFE is a needed effort that will
give the SHAPM better detail in his program and hopefully better con-
trol of his costs.
One of the areas addressed in the varied reporting efforts
made by the different PARMs is that of computerized reports. This
is evident as can be seen by the instituting of PARS. If all of the
reports were uniformly adapted to a computerized format it would
most likely solve many of the problems faced by both the SHAPMS and
the PARMS. Although the initial on- set of establishing these reports
would be time consuming and troublesome, these efforts would be
worthwhile in the standardization of the process.
E. PART I TASKING ASSIGNMENTS
1. General
Part I of the SPD provides the management directions from
the SHAPM to the PARM. It specifies objectives and requirements,
assigns responsibilities, establishes current project content, con-
figuration and schedules, directs the use of resources in addition to
funds and delineates special reporting requirements. In an effort to
insure that major tasks and their key elements have not been omitted
from the SPD, a standard format for Part I has been established.
A sample of this format guide is contained in Appendix C to
Enclosure 1 of NAVSHIPS INST 7000. 29B. The SHAPM will consider
each area in this format guide and include only those which he considers




2. Level of Detail
Part I of an SPD should specify in clear terms exactly what
must be performed. It should contain sufficient information to enable
the PARM to scope and price the job and then allow him to determine
whether stated delivery can be met. As a result of questionnaires and
interviews it was determined that 9 out of 10 of the SHAPM's contacted
felt that they were able to write Part I tasking assignments in sufficient
detail so as to convey to the PARMs exactly what is desired to them
(Appendix A, question El). One SHAPM responding with a "No" did not
feel that he was able to convey exactly what was desired of the PARM.
Another SHAPM responding with a "yes" stated, "The task assignments
are developed in close collaboration with the PARMS to support the
SHAPMS contractual responsibilities (sic). "
In contrast, only 4 out of 14 of the PARM's contacted felt that
the Part I of the SPD currently provides him with sufficient detail and
clarity to enable him to adequately scope and price the impending job
(Appendix B, question El). Over half of the PARM's contacted com-
plained that Part I's submitted by the SHAPM's lacked sufficient content,
detail, and clarity. They also felt that too much time and effort was
required by both parties to determine what the SHAPM wanted.
As one PARM stated, "Most SPD's, even though detailed, do not
specify the exact tasks to be performed. They mostly are level of effort
tasks as tasked by the SHAPM. The PARM has no real knowledge of what
level he will be tasked until the SHAPM issues the specific task".
This lack of coordination between the SHAPM and the PARM not
only results in inefficient utilization of manpower and dollars but it also
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contributes to the problems concerned in Section B, that of non-compli-
ance within the 21 day time frame. If a discussion phase was utilized
prior to the issuance of a SPD this might help to avoid this problem, or
at least reduce its magnitude. The researchers also feel that compliance
with the requirements of the PARM to develop a list of standard jobs and
task elements should be enforced (Discussion in Section C).
PARM's were asked if Part I of the SPD are too lengthy and
whether or not they felt that they could be shortened and still retain the
clarity of defined Management tasks to be performed (Appendix B, ques-
tion E2). Of those responding, 12 out of 16 felt that they could be
shortened. One PARM had an SPD that was 273 pages in length.
Another PARM responding with a "yes" stated, "only if standard tasking
is used and all parties, both SHAPM and PARM are educated down to
the working levels as to the meaning of the tasks, what it encompasses,
what products result, and why it costs X dollars to do. Right now they
(SHAPM; Part I) not only tell you what to do, but how to do it - this is
unnecessary". One PARM felt that the use of standards and specifica-
tions rather than detailed descriptions explaining how to do a job would
accomplish the same purpose.
In order to fully gain an understanding of the desired tasks
involved, SPD's should invoke portions of existing NAVSHIPS and other
authority directives, specifications, and publications by referencing the
desired portions or quote excerpts from them. The SHAPM must use
caution in referencing by ensuring that the referenced material is avail-
able to the PARM. Also care must be taken to ensure that references
that are not related to the performance of the required task by the
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PARMS are not included. To quote NAVSHIPS INST. 7000. 29B, "the
SHAPM and the PARM are both required to ensure that each under-
stands exactly what is to be performed and to determine whether desired
delivery dates can be met in terms of the scope and price negotiated. "
Therefore, a balance should be met between the size of the SPD as a
usable document and the detail entered to completely describe the
SHAPM's needs so as to be understood by all.
3. Utilization of Personnel
In order to carry out their assigned tasks PARM's can either
utilize their headquarters personnel or they can relegate their work to
field activities or commercial firms. If the task is to be accomplished
by headquarters personnel then it is not covered by SCN funds, whereas
if the work is "farmed out" then it is funded by SCN funds. In response
to the question of whether SHAPM's feel that PARM's utilize their
headquarters personnel to the maximum extent (Appendix A, question
E2), 3 out of 7 of those responding felt that they were not. One SHAPM
responding with a "No" stated, "Based on experience to date, the
PARMS continually cite lack of adequate headquarters manpower and
therefore farm out work to their field activities or commercial
contracts". The other two SHAPM's responding with "No" did not
clarify their answers. This particular question was not asked of the
PARM's. It is the opinion of the researchers that the PARM's do
utilize their Headquarters personnel as much as their manpower allows
them. Part of the problem lies, however, in the internal priorities
70

that the PARMs establish within their own offices. The PARM's
priorities may be different from those expected by the SHAPM thus
causing some of the SHAPMS work to be accomplished by an outside
activity when the SHAPM feels it isn't necessary.
Although field activity or contractor effort is SCN funded
while headquarters support comes from their own budget, the PARMS
are becoming short on available manpower. With this deficit they
have no choice other than to farm out their work. The criticism
stems from the preconceived feelings of many SHAPMS that PARMS
are not as sensitive to cost growth as they should be. So the PARM
is caught between two surfaces; that of lack of sufficient manpower
and a preconceived notion that he doesn't care how much of the SHAPM's
dollar he spends.
4. Exceptions to Tasks
SHAPM's were also asked if they felt that PARMS take excep-
tion to tasks which they feel are essential to the success of their
program (Appendix A, question E3). Out of nine responses, six felt
that exceptions were taken sometimes, one felt frequently and two felt
that exceptions were not taken at all. One of the SHAPM's that felt
exceptions were taken sometimes stated, "The problem here is that
SYSCOM(PARM) local implementing instructions, prepared to comply
with a NAVMAT or OPNAV requirement do not agree in terms of
methods and procedures". Another SHAPM indicated that exceptions
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were sometimes taken to the reporting area and in the level of detail
described in the Part II of the SPD.
Although it is difficult to gain an unbiased insight to this ques-
tion, it does point out that there is a feeling of mistrust between the
SHAPM and the PARM. With this type of working relation between the
two action parties, completeness of work can then become a question.
5. PARM Assistance
As previously pointed out, Part I tasks can be lengthy and
sometimes cumbersome with most of the burden placed on the PARMS.
In trying to find out if the PARMS could be assisted in some way, the
question was asked if there are items not currently covered in Part I
that could possibly assist them in their work (Appendix B, question E3).
The response was 7 out of 15 stating "yes". One PARM felt that MTBF
should be included in the Part I, stating, "it's required, but left out".
Although MTBF/MTTR requirements are not specifically spelled out
as such in NAVSHIPS INST. 7000. 29B, they are an integral part of
maintainability and reliability. For this reason we feel that they do
not need to be (nor should they be) specified and included in the Part I.
More specifically, these areas should be addressed in an area of train-
ing within the implementation of the SPD process. While some SHAPMS
do specifically state MTBF/MTTR requirements in their Part I's, it is
related to some individual "cog" or item. If these requirements were
specifically spelled out, the outcome, in most cases, would be in the
form of additional cost to the Government.
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Another PARM responding to this question indicated that the
Part I needs to "define the managerial needs /organization the PARM
is to develop to support the SHAPM". This is, in essence, wanting
the SHAPM to tell him what to do. We feel that SPD Part I's are
spelled out in sufficient detail to accomplish this task and that the
PARM should be able to organize to meet these requirements.
6. Conclusions
Most of the problem areas that readily occur within the SPD
process occur in the Part I tasking assignments. Many of these prob-
lems are brought about by lack of clarity in defining what the task
should be, and by the SHAPM not funding for the tasks or services he
requests in the Part I. Although the SHAPMS may feel they are
adequately conveying their ideas to the PARM in the Part I of the SPD
it is rather obvious that they are not. Otherwise there would be more
agreement on the part of the PARMS. This lack of communications
can cause a disconnect in the SPD process. We feel that one way to
correct this situation is more advance planning and a greater degree
of informal liaison between the SHAPM and the PARM early in the
program. Although there is no documentation that informal liaison
should occur, it is evident from discussions with various SHAPMS and
PARMS that there isn't enough of it taking place. It is most difficult
to write out a task and have it dealt with in the manner expected
without any pre-emptive discussions.
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Although there may be numerous reasons for lack of early-
planning, one of them might be a reluctance on the part of both parties
to organize for this. Another reason might be a breakdown in com-
munications when informal advanced planning does occur. We feel
that one possible way to prevent this communication breakdown is to
provide for some means of documentation for those areas discussed.
While documentation, whether by a recorder or method of tape, may
be cumbersome, we feel that it would allow the SHAPM to write his
Part I tasks with some degree of confidence on what the PARM will or
will not do.
The SHAPM must also realize that funds must be provided to
include all services that may be requested in the form of a Part I item.
As stated in an earlier section of the thesis, preparation of a
file of standard tasks would also be an area of major advantage in
preparing the Part I tasking assignments. It would, perhaps, create
uniformity and better information flow between the two offices.
F. PART II PRICING
1. General
Part II of the SPD provides task and/or item description at
the level of funding, funding information and other applicable account-
ing data and quantities, as required for proper control of the tasks
specified in Part I of the SPD. The basis for pricing of the Part II
is the five year POM. There are two stages of SPD development,
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"Unfunded" and "Funded" SPD's. These were discussed earlier in
the thesis. As mentioned, the "Unfunded" SPD's represent the ship
equipment configuration and task estimates which back up the POM
submissions. They contain no authorization to expend funds and are
considered to be "Planning estimates". As these funds become
appropriated and apportioned to the various SHAPM's, revisions are
made to portions of the SPD to direct those funds to be authorized
for expenditure. This converts the SPD into a "Funded" stature, and
thus the planning estimates become "Current Direction Dollars".
This concept is further defined in NAVSHIPS INST 7000. 29B.
While only one Part I is furnished to each PARM for all ships
of a class, separate Parts II are required for each program year. The
out-year Part IPs are for advance planning purposes. Funds for
execution of the SPD's are provided in three different ways. In the
case of NAVAIR and NAVORD the funds are allocated to the PARM by
a Program Funding Authorization (PFA) authorized by the SHAPM and
issued by the Executive Director for Financial Management in NAV-
SHIPS (Ships 10). For NAVSHIPS headquarters codes, NAVELEX
and equipment procurements by NAVSEC, funds are not formally
transferred, but are retained by Ships 10. Funds for NAVSEC tech-
nical support are formally transferred by Ships 10 to NAVSEC on
NAVCOMPT Form 140. A more detailed instruction of procedures
for completing Part II of the SPD is given in NAVSHIPS INST 7000. 29B.
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2. Documentation of Pricing Data
One of the initial questions involved in pricing of a Part II
line item is how the SHAPM initially arrives at a planning estimate.
PARMS are expected to provide the SHAPM with sufficient information
including citing comparative procurement documents to ensure that
the SHAPM understands and agrees to cost estimates. Various PARMS
were asked if this was complied with, (Appendix B, question Fl). Of
the 17 PARMS responding 9 said it is complied with, 3 said it was
not and 5 were unaware of the requirement. Of those PARMS respond-
ing with a "yes", two said they complied when requested by the SHAPM.
Two more felt that they were providing sufficient data but doubted that
the particular SHAPM's felt they were. One PARM stated, "The com-
parative procuement documents being Purchase Requests and copies of
contracts. Otherwise, cost estimates with justification are furnished,
relative to unfunded SPD's". Of the three PARMS answering with a
"no", two of them felt that they provided the SHAPM with sufficient
procurement data, but not necessarily "comparative" data; only when
requested. The other PARM felt that he had trouble getting this in-
formation himself. For the most part it is evident that the cost
information the SHAPM receives is in the form of previous like item
contracts or negotiations and past Purchase Requests. If this informa-




When questioned if they felt that the SHAPM's made good use
of the information sent to him (Appendix B, question F2), 9 out of 13
PARMS answered "yes". One PARM felt that since the SHAPM does
not have advance funds, he cannot take advantage of cost saving pro-
curements. Three others felt that the SHAPM sometimes follows the
information too closely and does not allow any flexibility for minor
changes.
3. Basis for Pricing
SHAPM's were asked if Part II's are priced in a manner so
that they know precisely what they are buying and at what price
(Appendix A, question Fl. In response, 3 out of 9 answered "yes".
One of the three responded by remarking, "Wherever possible, i. e.
,
rendered possible by circumstances such as state of development
Part II must be made definitive or else it has no meaning". In a new
system development it might be difficult for a PARM to perform any-
thing more than a best estimate on cost. Yet that cost would most
likely be what the SHAPM would have to rely on, at least in the ad-
vance planning stages.
To further amplify on this, it is interesting to look at some
of the remarks indicated by those SHAPM's responding with a "no"
to the question. One SHAPM stated that he didn't know precisely
what he was buying until "The PARM has negotiated the price".
Another remarked "not until contract award". These remarks appear
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reasonable and perhaps justified. Another SHAPM indicated that
"NAVAIR and NAVORD items are detailed on a system basis and not
to a component level. Other PARMS which are priced to a component
level are acceptably precise". Yet another SHAPM qualified his
response by stating, "Breakdowns on equipment and services have
never been provided by the PARMS. We know what we are buying but
we don't know the price of all elements - only a total price. "
Although these remarks may appear to be somewhat different
in their connotation, they all basically convey the same meaning.
Initial price out on a piece of equipment may be only an engineering
estimate or a last contract price. If component level breakdowns
were provided with these figures it would most likely eliminate guess
work on the part of the SHAPM and his staff in determining his item
costs.
In order to gain further insight into the problem of pricing
of Part II items we asked the SHAPM if he felt he was at the mercy
of the PARM in negotiating his prices or if he had independent cost
estimates to serve as a baseline for his negotiations (Appendix A,
question F2). Out of nine responses, six said "yes", one said "no",
one said "sometimes" and one doesn't negotiate. The one SHAPM
responding with "no" qualified his response by stating, "The SHAPM
does not have the capability of making independent estimates at the
equipment line item level". In other words this SHAPM feels he is
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at the mercy of the PARM in negotiating his prices. The one SHAPM
who answered with a "sometimes" replied by stating, "PARM input
compared to past experience and SHAPM opinion. SHAPM may have
independent analyses conducted on sensitive issues". In the opinion of
the researchers independent analysis on any item or issue should not
be necessary, rather the PARM should justify his cost estimates in
a way to alleviate any outside analysis.
Interestingly, those SHAPM replying "yes" to the question
really were directing their responses to the fact that they are at the
mercy of the PARMS. Some of the remarks were, "The only source
of GFE cost data is the responsible PARM", "Little, if any negotiation
of prices take place", "If it is a new buy, then there is a backup infor-
mation. Otherwise we must rely on the PARMS estimate" and "Indepen-
dent cost estimates are mostly "seat-of-the-pants " negotiation. The
PARM comes down some and the Project goes up some".
Although NAVSHIPS INST 7000. 29B does address, in general
terms, how the SPD Part II items are to be filled out, it does not
address specifically how these costs are arrived at. As seen from the
above comments it appears to be fairly definite that the PARMS have
nothing more than their own cost estimates or past contracts to arrive
at these figures. The difficult part of this is that it is doubtful if they
can provide all the information a SHAPM feels he might desire.
However, if the PARMS (uniformly) provide cost estimates that break
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out the various costs down to the component level, then perhaps there
might be some creditability given them by the SHAPMS. This is
apparently done by a few PARMS and those SHAPMS receiving this
type of cost data appear, for the most part, to be satisfied with it.
It should be done by all of them.
In addressing the area of Systems Engineering Costs the
question was asked of the SHAPMS if they felt that those tasks nor-
mally designated a Systems Engineering function (R/M/A, Safety,
ILS, etc. ) are realistically priced or do they serve as a source of
management reserve for the PARMS (Appendix A, Question F_3).
Three out of nine SHAPMS responding considered them to be realistic,
four considered them a reserve source, one felt they 'were not realis-
tic and one SHAPM stated "costs for these items are not broken out. "
The one SHAPM that considered them not realistic qualified this by
stating "not realistic due to lack of baseline". Comments by those
SHAPMS that consider them to be a reserve source for the PARM
include, "Prices for these items vary with the equipment complexity.
Part II line items costs normally include a margin for support elements'
and "It is believed that such tasks are over priced generally and are
used to cover cost increases in equipment and farm out of support
tasks". One SHAPM who quoted this as being realistic stated, "Not
separately funded, normally a part of the PARMS Headquarters
responsibility. " The basic problem in this area of Part II pricing is
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actually two fold. One is that many SHAPM's apparently expect the
PARM to build excess or "fat" into their program and this is a logical
area for that to happen. This goes back to an area mentioned earlier
in this thesis; that is, SHAPMS don't trust the PARMS and vice versa.
The second problem lies in the fact that these costs are generally not
broken out for the SHAPM. "When PARMS cost out these items they
should break them out as much as possible and provide them to the
SHAPM.
4. Financial Control
The level of financial control and financial control procedures
are well defined in NAVSHIP INST 7000. 29B. The level of financial
control is the total amount of Current Direction dollars assigned to
the PARM in each specific Part II of the SPD. Funds are transferred
from one SPD Part II to another by the SHAPM in concern. In general,
the PARM has the flexibility to fund procurement and other actions
at an amount in excess of any individual SPD Part II line item as long
as it is done within the guidance outlined in the instruction. When a
PARM effects a procurement resulting in a cost savings he will advise
the SHAPM concerned in the required financial report. If there is a
cost increase that will exceed the Current Direction dollar amount
assigned for any SPD Part II item, and there is an off- setting reduction
possible for another item, he is supposed to process the necessary
procurement document for the item for which Current Direction
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dollars are being exceeded and then provide the appropriate SHAPM,
within five working days, with the information and an explanation of
his actions. If the cost increase is without offsetting reductions then
the PARM is supposed to inform the appropriate SHAPM in writing of
the potential cost-growth, certify that there is no offset, and then
request the additional funds. The PARM will then wait for SHAPM'
s
response.
In dealing with this financial control we asked the SHAPM'
s
if, in reporting financial status of their programs, PARMS report any
under run (Appendix A, Question F-4). Seven out of nine responding
SHAPMS agreed that the PARM will report an under-run. One SHAPM
disagreed, while one SHAPM asserted that the PARM will report it
"no more or less than an over-run". One of the SHAPM's agreeing
felt that the PARM will report an under- run "especially when planning-
amounts exceed the contract award amount". Another SHAPM agreed
stating, "Since all PARM's must submit copies of their contracts to
the SHAPMS, the SHAPM is aware of a cost under-run independently
of whether the PARM reports it or not".
The question was then asked of the SHAPMS if they felt that
PARMS will return excess funds in the event of an under-run (Appendix
A, Question F_5). This question was unanimously responded to by 10
out of 10 SHAPMS with a "yes". Some of the remarks included in the
responses, did however, leave room for doubt that this action was of
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a spontaneous nature. One SHAPM commented, "SHAPM must take
initiative and prepare the funding document in order to have the funds
returned". Another SHAPM replied, 'After all procurement/contract-
ing actions of the total SPD requirements have been completed". Other
comments included: Generally on close out of SPD's", "If under-run
is significant", and "very, very slowly (years later)".
Although the financial control procedures for cost increases
are well defined in the NAVSHIPS INST 7000. 29B they do not elaborate
on cost saving procedures. Once the PARM informs the SHAPM of
a cost savings in accordance with the financial report, the question
then becomes "What does he do with the money? ". At this point the
money is either set aside by the PARM for further direction by the
SHAPM or the PARM can use it in accordance with the procedures
outlined for cost increases with off-setting reductions. If, by some
chance, these funds are not utilized then they are to be returned to the
SHAPM at the end of the contract.
5. Conclusion
The SPD Part II pricing is a major concern to both PARM
and SHAPM; especially the latter. PARMS are fairly well protected
from exposure to cost growth in most major programs. Even though
they are directly involved, it is not their money that is being spent.
In addition it is usually the vendors that establish the prices on the
initial items. With these in mind the PARMS tend to be not as sensitive
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to cost growth as they should be. There are other items that enter
into the complexity of Part II pricing. The PARMS cost estimates
are only as good as his engineering estimates, his Engineering Change
Proposals (ECP) his Purchase Requests, etc. In many instances he
is caught in the middle and has pressure on him from both sides; the
SHAPM and the Contractor. If he quotes the SHAPM a price for a piece
of equipment and then gets caught in a sole source buy with an increased
price, the increase directly affects the SHAPMS budget. But it also
effects the PARM's position in that the SHAPM considers it the PARM's
fault. Inflation also takes its toll in pricing of the Part II's. This
is particularly impacting when a SHAPM has to buy one or two item
buys for an individual ship (such as in the case of PF Leadship).
When it comes time for the SHAPM to procure these same items for
his follow ships there will obviously be a great variance between the
initial and present costs of the item. This is not something the SPD
process will be able to overcome, at least until we reach a stable
position in our nation's economy. Also contracting with options on
multi-year contracts can create an equal problem. These options re-
quire an exercise date which must be met in order to remain within
costs. Any late passage of an appropriations bill will impact heavily
on exercising these options; usually in an area of increased costs.
Another problem lies in the fact that, presently, some of
the SYSCOMS accounting systems do not have a level of detail desired
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by some SHAPMS. In other words, they are held at the system level
rather than the component level. This problem primarily amounts to
uniformity by the various PARMS and it should be corrected when
PARS goes into effect on 1 July 1974.
As indicated by one of the PARMS, one problem in the pricing
process surfaces at a later date, that is six months up to two years
after a particular SPD has been negotiated. A SHAPM will sometimes
want the PARM to rejustify his costs. When this happens the entire
pricing process starts all over again. This costs both time and money
and it shouldn't have to have been done. It gets back to the problem
that "Nobody believes anyone else. "
G. SHAPM PRIMACY
1. General
As noted in numerous directives, Project Managers operate
on a given philosophy of complete control over the acquisition of their
defined system. DOD INST 5000. 1 establishes the baseline guidance
for the SHAPM in his acquisition of his project. CNM and NAVSHIPS
Instructions and Directives, including the SHAPM Charter, further
define the guidelines in which the PM has control over his project.
As stated in NAVSHIPS INST 7000. 29B, "This instruction establishes
a standard Ship Project Directive (SPD) System, by which all Ship
Acquisition Project Managers (SHAPMS) shall specify and control their
project tasks within the Naval Material Command and with those
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authorities outside NAVMAT who agree to participate in the system".
All of these tend toward the subject of SHAPM Primacy; does he have
too much control or not enough.
2. Recognition of SHAPM Management
Although current DOD policy stresses the importance of Pro-
ject Managers managing their programs, the question was asked, of
both SHAPM and PARM, if the PARMS recognize and observe this
principle in dealing with the SHAPM (Appendix A, B, Question G-l).
In dealing with the SHAPMS, 7 out of 9 responses felt that the PARMS
do recognize the importance and authority of the SHAPM in managing
his program. Of these seven, three SHAPMS felt this was true for
the most part, while one SHAPM felt that "They recognize the prin-
ciple, but they often don't agree with it philosophically. " During one
interview conducted it was noted that one SYSCOM unilaterally decided
that SHAPMS did not need to have copies of their contracts nor did
they need to know detailed cost information. This SYSCOM also felt
that if the SHAPM wanted something that the SYSCOM didn't feel they
ordinarily should provide, then the SHAPM should provide additional
funding. This created a two-fold problem; one of resisting the SHAPMS
authority and the other that the SHAPM could never tell in advance how
much work the SYSCOM would perform or how much was to be farmed
out. One of the SHAPMS responding with a "no", stated "Not entirely,
probably because of the large numbers of Project Managers and a
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lack of clear relative priority. " This, in itself, could be a problem
of a larger magnitude. When one PARM deals with several SHAPMS
there can be conflicts of interest. Without an assigned priority it
becomes obvious that some jobs are not going to be treated as a
particular SHAPM may desire. Perhaps at this point, the SHAPM
may feel that the PARM is degrading his managerial authority over
his project. A possible outcome of this may become indifference on
the part of the PARM when he feels the pressure of the SHAPM trying
to usurp his authority. Although this is merely postulation, it is
quite obvious that it can occur.
In looking at the responses of the PARMS, 16 out of 17 felt
they recognized and observed the importance of the SHAPM in managing
his program. The one PARM that responded with a. "no" to the ques-
tion felt that since there are more Project Managers than just those
in NAVSHIPS there is a caveat in the organization that leads to over-
lapping of jurisdiction within the system. Of the remaining PARM
responses the general trend of answers support the hypothesis that
SHAPMS tend to overmanage their PARMS. One PARM responded
by stating, "I think PARMS recognize PM's authority and problems,
but PARMS frequently feel SHAPM oversteps his authority and Charter
so as to conflict with PARMS Charter and necessary authority".
Another PARM stated, "To the best of our ability. Yet most SHAPMS
tend to over manage which sometimes results in their ultimately
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receiving less cooperation". One PARM felt that SHAPMS generally
try to exercise more internal control over PARMS than they do over
their own contractors while another felt that the SHAPM shouldn't
try to dictate technical knowledge, i. e. , engineering and politics
must be separated.
While it is easy to empathize with the PARMS on their feelings
of over management it should remain clear, that unless the PARMS
accept the primacy of the SHAPM in practice the SPD system will not
be completely effective. The researchers feel that the management
policies of the SHAPMS should be directed to that manner which
enables him to best perform his functions as a Project Manager. It
is further felt that the SHAPM and his staff must have or acquire a
high degree of technical expertise in order to be knowledgeable in his
contact with the PARMS and the contractors. We do agree that the
SHAPM should not, however, dictate technology to the PARMS unless
it becomes of necessity.
A second question was asked of the SHAPMS as to whether
they feel that the SPD process authoritatively defines and supports the
authority, responsibility and accountability of the SHAPM (Appendix A,
Question G-2). Six out of ten of the SHAPMS responded with a "yes".
Of these six, only one SHAPM noted any qualifying remarks; that is,
"As far as SCN funds are concerned". It is the feelings of the
researchers that this should also apply to MILCON, OPN, and O&MN
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funds as well (as stated in NAVSHIPS INST 7000. 29B). Of the SHAPMS
responding with "no", one felt that "the SPD instruction is an operational
guide, not the document which defines SHAPM aiithority". It must be
noted that the SPD is the historical documented record of negotiated
agreements between the SHAPMS and the PARMS that tracks their
mutual participation in the Ship Project from the initiation of the project
by "Unfunded" SPD's through "Funded" SPD's to the delivery of a total
ship to the active fleet. In order to provide the SHAPM with the detail
to accomplish this task it must define and support the authority, respon-
sibility, and accountability of the SHAPM. The researchers feel that
this is accomplished through the SPD process and its back-up references
as noted in NAVSHIPS INST 7000. 29B.
PARMS were also asked the question of whether they feel that
the SPD process authoritatively defines and supports the authority,
responsibility and accountability of the SHAPM (Appendix B, Question
G-2). Fourteen out of seventeen responded with a "yes". One of the
dissenting PARMS felt that it did not allow the SHAPM sufficient
authority. Another PARM who felt that it does, qualified his answer
by stating, "If used properly by the SHAPM, I find there is a lack of
understanding of the SPD process in most SHAPM's. NAVSHIPS needs
to do a better job of managing and of education down to the lowest
levels". Another PARM states, "The written procedures are generally




The area of SHAPM primacy is of general concern to the
operation of the SPD process. Although the above comments by various
PARMS address the issue raised by the question it is of our opinion
that there is a broader meaning to them. It tends to point to the fact
that PARMS feel they are on a something-less -than equal level with
that of the SHAPM. Also since different SHAPM's operate at different
management levels there is a tendency to place different requirements
on the PARM's. These requirements can be over and above what the
PARM's are staffed to give. As a consequence, many of the PARMS
don't want the detailed supervision that the SHAPM's are applying.
This creates a tendency for the PARM to be reluctant in his dealings
with the SHAPM's. The researchers are in accord with the finding
of the SPD Appraisal Team in that the problem is not due to a lack of
published policy. It is our opinion that the SHAPM has the required
authority by virtue of •written directives and instructions, to force
the system to operate properly. The SHAPM must have the initiative
to exercise this authority or it will be lost. It is realized by these
researchers that it is many times easier said than done, especially
if it concludes to the fact of putting a PARM on "report" to higher
authority for failure to respond. To our knowledge this has not been
done in the past. Admittedly, it is unfortunate that a system should




H. EVALUATION OF SPD INSTRUCTION
1. General
The SPD process was first implemented on 5 May 1969 by the
issuance of NAVSHIP INST 7000. 29. Although this instruction was,
in general, a well conceived document, there was evidenced a number
of deficiencies as the process continued. In order to correct these
deficiencies, NAVSHIP INST 7000.29 (series) was re-evaluated and
re-issued as a Bravo series on 7 April 1972. The Bravo edition con-
tained a good many of the corrections and recommendations that were
surfaced as a result of the appraisal of the SPD System. The appraisal
report was conducted in 1970 by a team from NAVSHIPS Appraisal
Office (Ships 01D) and was submitted to SHIPS 00 for approval.
At present there is a proposed NAVSHIPS INST 7000. 29C
edition in circulation to the various SYSCOMS for comment and
approval. Once this Instruction is issued it will incorporate any
pending recommendations made by the SPD Appraisal Team and will
include the directions of NAVMAT INST 7000. 14B of 30 July 1971.
This NAVMAT INST is entitled "Management Within The Naval Material
Command for Ship Development Acquisition/Conversion Projects Under
All Appropriations" and specifically directs the implementation of
NAVSHIPS directives, to conform to the policy contained within the
Instruction. Additional instructions issued by the various SYSCOMS
further implement the SPD system at the PARM level. For example
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NAVELEX INST 7000. 15, NAVORD INST 4265. 2A, and NAVSEC INST
5430. 6 all deal with the implementation of the SPD process within the
respective Commands.
2. NAVSHIP Authority
As a result of interviews with the various working levels
within the SYSCOMS the question of authority of one SYSCOM over
another was broached. NAVSHIPS INST 7000. 29B in effect is one
SYSCOM directing another. In responding to the question of whether
or not it would be more authoritative if it were issued in its present
form as a NAVMAT INSTRUCTION (Appendix A, Question H-8), 8 out
of 10 SHAPMS felt that it would not. One SHAPM responded with a
"no" by stating, "Each SYSCOM has a charter which gives it authority
in certain areas. NAVSHIPS has authority over total ship integration".
This authority is granted by NAVMAT INST 5460. 2 of 20 August 1969
and is further implemented by NAVMAT INST 7000. 14B. Two more
SHAPM's also felt that NAVSHIPS INST 7000. 29B implements CNM
authority based on NAVMAT INST 7000. 14B. Another SHAPM disagreed
with the question and stated "SHAPM's do not need another level to
become intimately involved in coordination of SHAPM effort", while
yet another felt that there was no authority for ship acquisition clearly
established in NAVSHIPS. The two SHAPMS who agreed with the ques-
tion did not comment on it.
This same question (Appendix B, Question H-3) was asked of the
PARMS and only 7 out of 16 disagreed with it. Of the PARM's that
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disagreed with the question, two of them felt that it should be a joint
instruction signed by all SYSCOMS. Another PARM felt that as long
as it is a mutually agreeable document it doesn't make much difference
who issues it; the present system keeps the disagreement in the open
where it will get resolved. Yet another PARM responded by stating
"NAVSHIPS is the responsible command for overall ship building and
as such should issue its own policy and directives in accomplishing
its mission". One PARM felt that it isn't material who signs the
instruction as long as he has the authority and concurrence from the
necessary level of authority to do so. Other reasons given for dis-
agreement were: "would make it just another bureaucratic bundle"
and "need more than CNM signature" to make the system operate
smoothly.
Of those PARM's agreeing with the question, two of them
felt that the SHAPM should also be located at the NAVMAT level while
another stated that it "should either be a CNM instruction or a Joint
SYSCOM Instruction with all parties signing it".
3. Conclusions
Although the reasons given by both the SHAPM' s and the
PARM's are primarily personal feelings toward the present system
they do address the issue of uncertainty in the SPD process. It also
points out the need for a uniform implementation of the process which
would be amenable by those concerned with its operation. At present
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it is evident that this may be one of the reasons the SPD process does
not have the complete cooperation needed between the various SYSCOMS
and the SHAPM's and PARM's. Although a NAVMAT INST would surely
raise the level of authority in the implementation process, the research-
ers feel that the authority is already present by the way in which the
system operates, i. e. , the chain of command and the NAVMAT im-
plementing instructions directed toward the SPD process. This does
not, however, subside or alleviate the personal conflicts involved. It
is of our opinion that a joint instruction, agreed upon by all SYSCOMS
concerned, would have a more meaningful purpose and direction than
the present way of one SYSCOM directing another. A joint instruction
would most likely surface the issues of disagreement within the present
instruction and hopefully establish an area of agreement.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. GENERAL
If the Ship Acquisition Project Manager (SHAPM) is to have the
authority and responsibility necessary to successfully manage his
program it is absolutely essential that he have a contractual agree-
ment with the supporting or participating managers (PARMS) who
procure his Government Furnished Equipment (GFE). The Ship
Project Directive (SPD) provides him with that agreement and if viewed
by both SHAPM and PARM as a contract, it can serve as an effective
means of minimizing the occurrences of late delivery of GFE and
delivery of defective GFE which characterized most ship projects
during the 1960's.
Besides its contractual aspects, the SPD should also be viewed
as a vital communications channel between SHAPM and PARM. Sup-
ported by the required reports and by informal dialogue, the SPD
provides the means for an exchange of information and ideas so vital
to the success of a ship project.
The SPD process has made significant contributions toward en-
hancing the SHAPMS authority and in making him something other than
a manager in name only. At the same time it has its imperfections,-
many of which we have addressed. In addition to the specific recom-
mendations which follow we believe that it is imperative that the
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effectiveness of the SPD process be periodically evaluated by high level
officials within the NAVAL MATERIAL COMMAND (NMC), and its
components, to ensure that it is operating as intended. Only in this
way can the viability of what we consider an absolutely essential
system be guaranteed.
B. SPECIFICS
1. The next revision of the SPD instruction should be issued as
a joint instruction.
In our view the entire SPD process has been conceived as a
bridge to transverse the sometimes artificial barriers erected by the
SYSCOM charters. While it has succeeded, to some degree, in achiev-
ing this objective, it is questionable, in our minds, whether a NAV.
SHIPS Instruction will ever fully eliminate these barriers.
Initially, this problem was addressed with the thought in mind
that perhaps a NAVMAT Instruction should replace NAVSHIPS 7000. 29B.
This has been rejected because the level of detail required in the SPD
instruction can only be effectively established at the SYSCOM level.
Additionally, the areas of contention which presently characterize the
SPD process will not be resolved by a NAVMAT Instruction. Only
negotiation between the parties concerned will result in a meaningful
resolution.
By thoroughly and intelligently negotiating a joint instruction,
the resulting document should reflect the views and interests of each
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of the SYSCOMS and therefore strict compliance would be within the
bounds imposed by the SYSCOM charters.
2. The training programs originally recommended by the NAV.
SHIPS Appraisal Report (Ref. 1) should be implemented immediately
in both NAVSHIPS and in the other SYSCOMS.
Perhaps the only common thread binding our returned ques-
tionnaires into an entity was the fact that, in varying degrees, both
SHAPMS and PARMS were unfamiliar with the complete SPD process.
We have found no evidence that training of any sort exists and can only
conclude that each newly-formed ship project and each new PARM is
allowed to fend for itself in the SPD environment. In view of the
dollars involved in the various GFE transactions this appears to us to
be an unrealistic way of doing business.
3. NAVSHIPS Instruction 7000. 29B should be revised to require
preparation of unfunded SPD's when the ship configurations becomes
reasonably stable.
To link the "preferred" time for issuance of the unfunded
SPD to an arbitrary calendar date (say 24 months prior to the Ship
Program Project Year) is to deny the fluidity which exists in most
ship projects during the conceptual phase. In most instances the SHAPM
and his staff are singularly ill- equipped to cope with the required
changes to his SPD's which inevitably would be required if the SPD's
are issued too early.
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While this recommendation grants the SHAPM wide latitutde
in determining when is the proper time for issuance of unfunded SPD's
we do not feel that the SHAPM should deny himself the expertise which
the PARM can provide. Therefore, in conjunction with this recom-
mendation we would also levy the following requirement.
4. NAVSHIPS Instruction 7000. 29B should be revised to require
that SHAPM's submit, in advance of his unfunded SPD's, the applicable
portions of his current configuration baseline to the appropriate
PARM's. Further, this requirement should be supported by the
additional requirement that PARM's review and respond to these base-
lines in a specified period of time.
The PARM can and should be an integral part of the SHAPM's
advisory team. He should be brought into the picture as early as
possible and this is inherently recognized in the current requirement
for early submission of unfunded SPD's. While we cannot question
the intent of this requirement, we do question the means and in this
we are nearly unanimously supported by the SHAPMS currently
chartered.
5. The unfunded SPD, when issued should be written in sufficient
detail so that only a revision to Parts II and III would normally be
required to transform the unfunded SPD into a funded document.
While we recognize that configuration changes will occur, no
matter how judicious the SHAPM is in deciding when is the proper time
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to issue his unfunded SPD's, we cannot envision many instances where
these changes would necessitate extensive revision of Part I of the
SPD.
6. NAVSHIPS Instruction 7000. 29B should be revised so as to
allow the PARM 30 calendar days from date of issue to review the
SPD.
Although the majority of both SHAPMS and PARMS indicate
that the current 21_day review period is adequate, their supporting
remarks, the remarks of those SHAPMS and PARMS who felt that it
was an inadequate time, and our own personal observation indicate
that the current time for review is insufficient. We believe that
30 calendar days to be a more realistic time frame for review of
most SPD's and, coupled with the present 21 day extension should
establish an ample time frame in which to review all SPD's regardless
of complexity.
7. NAVSHIPS Instruction 7000. 29B should be revised to permit
an automatic 21 day extension to the PARM review period provided
the PARM requests, in writing, such an extension within 15 calendar
days of the date of issue of the SPD.
The current instructions concerning the extension are vague
but the implication appears to us to be that the extension is solely
at the discretion of the SHAPM. Only the PARM can realistically
evaluate the complexity of a particular SPD and project how long it
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will require to review it. We feel that the PARM should be able to
adequately evaluate the SPD and make a determination of a need for
extension within 15 calendar days of the date of issue of the SPD. It
is not our intention, however, to make the 15 day mark a go-no-go
cut-off date. If, after the 15 day period has elapsed and the PARM
determines a need for extension, then he should be able to request
the extension in writing as before. This extension should not be auto-
matic, however, but should be at the discretion of the SHAPM concerned.
Thus he should have more latitude in requesting the extension than is
now implied by NAVSHIPS Instruction 7000. 29B.
8. NAVSHIPS Instruction 7000. 29B should be revised to require
that SHAPM' s report any non-compliance with the review period
immediately to higher authority.
While we can appreciate the reluctance of SHAPMS to seek
the aid of higher authority in enforcing the requirements of the SPD
instruction, we do feel that the precedent needs to be established.
The immediate result might be to re-enforce the SHAPM-PARM
adversarial relationship but in the long run it will, we believe, con-
tribute to the viability of the SPD process.
9. NAVSHIPS Instruction 7000. 29B should be revised so as to
allow SHAPM and PARM 30 calendar days to resolve both major and
minor differences prior to referring to higher authority.
From past history the current 15 calendar day resolution
period is totally inadequate. While 30 days may seem a rather
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arbitrary extension we believe it would be sufficient time to resolve
most differences. Both SHAPM and PARM should, of course, be
encouraged to resolve differences sooner but this is an educational
process rather than something which can be issued as a mandate in
the SPD instruction.
10. NAVSHIPS Instruction 7000. 29B should be revised to require
the SHAPM to report, at the conclusion of the 30-day resolution period,
the status of SHAPM-PARM negotiations and of the differences.
We oppose the view that the SHAPM should automatically
refer incomplete negotiations of differences to higher authority for
resolution. We can foresee instances where SHAPM and PARM
would be near agreement at the conclusion of the resolution period.
To refer the matter at that point to a higher authority could undo
their negotiation efforts and have a detrimental effect on their future .
relationship. On the other hand to ignore the referral requirement as
it is presently written would be a degradation of the entire SPD process;
a small degradation, perhaps, but a succession of these small occur-
rences could eventually subvert the entire SPD system.
11. NAVSHIPS Instruction 7000. 29B should be revised to require
that PARMS shall vice should prepare a list of standardized tasks and
and task descriptions.
While we can sympathize with one PARMS' belief that this would
be too time-consuming, we believe that the effort expended would prove
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invaluable. As it is our opinion that the SHAPM and the PARM should
be brought together at a very early stage in the SPD process (as dis-
cussed in paragraph 14 of this section), we view this effort of standard,
ized tasks and task descriptions as a method to provide the SHAPM/
PARM interface with some degree of continuity and hopefully a means
of establishing early visibility and discussions in the process.
We do not feel that the file should act as a binding constraint
on the SHAPM but rather should act as a starting point for structuring
his particular program. Any deviation from a standard task should,
of course, only be made after discussing with the PARM the feasibility
of doing so.
12. NAVSHIPS Instruction 7000. 29B should be revised so that it
requires PARMS to be uniform in their submission of required reports
to the SHAPM.
Our research concluded that the PARMS presently adapt their
reporting format to that format already established within their parent
command and not to the format required by NAVSHIPS Instruction
7000. 29B. Therefore when SHAPMS receive these reports from the
various PARMS the report structure is not the same. This can tend
to be not only confusing and misleading but can also cause oversight
in areas of importance. If provisions were made so that a NAVMAT
command-wide computerized reporting system could be adopted for
these required reports it would establish uniformity and provide an
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effective and efficient means of minimizing confusion and of standard-
izing the reporting process.
13. Provide for additional reporting requirements for Government
Furnished Information as proposed by (proposed) NAVSHIPS Instruction
7000.29C.
Government Furnished Information (GFI) consists of recorded
scientific, technical or management information, in various forms
which the government is obligated by statute, legal precedent, regula-
tion or contract to furnish prospective bidders, contractors and par-
ticipating managers. The present system does not provide for the
integration of this information. Lack of adequate GFI has been a
contributing factor to a marked increase in cost growth and delays in
deliveries of ships, systems and equipments to the Navy. This is
especially true in new ship construction. GFI or information required-
for its use can be functional throughout the ships life cycle for such
purposes as maintenance support documentation, preparation of
operating instruction, configuration status accounting, provisioning
and repurchasing. It is therefore important that the SHAPM be able
to track the necessary GFI reqiiired for his program in order to min-
imize redundant procurements of GFI and yet assure its availability
when required.
14. Provide for a greater degree of informal liaison between the
SHAPM and the PARM prior to the writing of an SPD Part I.
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One of the most important, and yet most difficult, areas in
writing an SPD is that of the Part I, management direction. It is
difficult in that defining exactly what is needed and what can be
accomplished are sometimes two different items. While it is encum-
bent vipon the SHAPM to ensure that the PARM clearly understands
the tasking assignment, it is necessary that they also be of sufficient
detail to support his requirements. The major area of concern herein
lies in the fact that too often unnecessary time and effort is expended
by both parties in the determination of what the SHAPM has requested
in the guise of his management direction.
We feel that one method of overcoming this hinderance is by
a greater degree of informal liaison or advanced planning by both the
SHAPM and the PARM. While we are aware that this does occur to
an extent it should be done on a wider basis. More importantly, when-
advanced planning does occur, there should be some means of document-
ing what transcribed between the two parties. Our primary concern
for this is so that nothing will be lost between the planning and actual




SHIP PROJECT DIRECTIVE QUESTIONNAIRE
FOR SHAPM RESPONSE ONLY
A. The following questions are concerned with the requirement for
unfunded SPD's 24 months prior to the Ship Project Program Year.
1. This is a realistic requirement and one in which my staff
and myself can easily comply.
Agree 1 Disagree 8
Remarks:
Unfunded SPD's for "planning purposes" serve a useful
purpose in that they enable the PARMs to better support
me in preparing my Acquisition Plan, Budget Submissions,
and the solicitation for ship construction.
Agree 5 Disagree 5
An unfunded SPD should be written in sufficient detail so that
only a revision to Parts II and III is necessary to make the
SPD a viable, funded document.
Agree 7 Disagree 3
Remarks:
4. By utilizing unfunded SPD's well in advance of the program
year, ample time is available to resolve any exceptions which
PARMS might take to Part I tasking and reporting require-
ments.




Thus the issuance and acceptance of the funded SPD would
not involve a lengthy review process.
Agree 7 Disagree 2
Remarks
:
The following questions are concerned with the SPD issuance and
acceptance procedures established by NAVSHIPD Inst. 7000. 29B.
1. From my experience 21 days is adequate time for the PARM
to either accept the SPD or state in writing his reasons for
rejection.
Agree 7 Disagree 2
Remarks
From my own experience minor differences can generally
be resolved within 15 days.
Agree 7 Disagree 1
Remarks
3. My office has issued SPDS and of these were
originally rejected for major exceptions.
4. In those cases where a written rejection was received
were resolved at the PARM _ SHAPM/PM level, were
resolved by COMNAVSHIPS, and were resolved at
the CNM level.
5. The average time to resolve a major exception was:
less than 2 months
2_4 months
more than 4 months
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6. If there is disagreement on an SPD, there is a critical time
period for the need of the GFE, the PARM should not let a
"piece of paper" (SPD) hold him up from starting his work
on procuring the GFE.
YES 7 NO 3
Remarks
:
7. If the 21 day acceptance/rejection period can not be complied
with and both SHAPM and PARM cannot work out a resolution
within the required 15 days after rejection, the SHAPM/PM
should automatically go to higher authority for resolution.
YES 6 NO 4
Remarks
C. The following questions are concerned with the requirement that
PARMS develop a list of standard jobs and task elements with
adequate descriptions which should be maintained on file with
NAVSHIPS 051.
1. To your knowledge has this been accomplished?
YES 1 NO 9
Remarks










4. If the file were complete would it be useful?
YES 6 NO 2
Remarks:
D. The following questions are concerned with the standardized
reporting requirements in 7000. 29B.
1. Are the required reports, in the format and at the time
intervals specified, currently being submitted?




2. Does the present reporting system provide you with
adequate visibility of your GFE?
YES 2 NO 6
Remarks
3. Would you prefer to have more leeway in establishing
your own reporting requirements?




4. In your opinion would additional reporting requirement in any-
way constitute "over-control" of the PARM's program?
YES 2 NO 6
Remarks
:
The following questions are concerned with the tasking assignments
normally contained in Part I.
1. Do you feel that you are able to write tasking assignments in
sufficient detail so as to convey to the PARMS exactly what is
desired of them?
YES 9 NO 1
Remarks
Do you feel that PARMS are utilizing their Headquarters
personnel to the maximum extent possible in accomplishing
assigned tasks?
YES 4 NO 3
Remarks:
3. Do you feel that PARMS take exception to tasks which you
feel are essential to the success of your program:
Sometimes 6
Frequently 1




F. The following questions are concerned with pricing of Part II of
the SPD.
1. Are Part IPs priced in a manner so that you know precisely
what you are buying and at what price?
YES 3 NO 6
Remarks
:
2. In negotiating prices are you at the mercy of the PARMS or
do you have independent cost estimates to serve as a baseline
for negotiation?
YES 6 NO 1
Remarks:
3. Do you feel that those tasks normally designated a Systems
Engineering function (i. e. R/M/A, ILS, Safety, etc. ) are





1 - Not realistic
4. In reporting financial status of their programs PARMS will
report an under-run.
AGREE 7 DISAGREE 1
Remarks






6. Do you feel that PARMS "pad" their price estimates?
YES 5 NO 4
Remarks:
G. The following questions concern the issue of SHAPM primacy.
1. Current DOD policy stresses the importance of Project
Managers managing their programs. Do you feel that
PARMS recognize and observe this principle in their dealings
with you?
YES 7 NO 2
Remarks:
2. Do you feel that the SPD process authoritatively defines and
supports the authority, responsibility and accountability of
the SHAPM?
YES 6 NO 4
Remarks
:
H. The following questions are of a general nature and relate to the
mechanics of the SPD process as they relate to your program.
1. How many SPD's are you currently administering?
2. How many persons on your staff are currently engaged in
writing/administering SPD's?
3. For your program how many people should you have to write/
administer SPD's in the most efficient manner?
4. If you had the option of staffing your office so that you could
procure a total ship system would you prefer this to the
present system of utilizing the functional support of the
various SYSCOMS?




5. If you had to staff your office for a total ship procurement,
how many people do you feel that this would require?
How many people are currently assigned to your staff?
6. Do you feel that the NAVSHIPS/NAVORD/NAVELEX Interface
Management Task Force serves a useful function?
YES 5 NO 3
Remarks
:
Do you feel that this task force resolves interface problems
or merely delays them?
Resolves 6 Delays 1
Remarks:
1 _ Neither
8. NAVSHIPSINST. 7000. 29B in effect is one SYSCOM directing
another. It would be more authoritative if it were issued in
its present form as a CNM Instruction.
AGREE 2 DISAGREE 8
Remarks:
9. The SPD process is an attempt to solve with paper what is
basically an organizational and command problem.





SHIP PROJECT DIRECTIVE QUESTIONNAIRE
FOR PARM RESPONSE ONLY
A. The following questions are concerned with the requirement for
unfunded SPD's 24 months prior to the Ship Project Program Year.
1. Unfunded SPD's for "planning purposes" serve a useful purpose
in that they enable the PARMs to better support the SHAPM in
preparing his Acquisition Plan, Budget Submissions, and the
solicitation for ship construction.
AGREE 15 DISAGREE 2
Remarks
:
2. An unfunded SPD should be written in sufficient detail so that
only a revision to Parts II and III is necessary to make the
SPD a viable, funded document.
AGREE 13 DISAGREE 3
Remarks:
By utilizing unfunded SPD's well in advance of the program
year ample time is available to resolve any exceptions which
PARMS might take to Part I tasking and reporting require-
ments.
AGREE 14 DISAGREE 3
Remarks:
4. Thus the issuance and acceptance of the funded SPD would not
involve a lengthy review process.




B. The following questions are concerned with the SPD issuance and
acceptance procedures established by NAVSHIPSINST 7000. 29B.
1. From my experience 21 days is adequate time for the PARM
to either accept the SPD or state in writing his reasons for
rejection.
AGREE 11 DISAGREE 5
Remarks
:
2. From my own experience minor differences can generally
be resolved within 15 days.
AGREE 15 DISAGREE 2
Remarks:
3. In those cases where a written rejection was received,
were resolved at the PARM-SHAPM/PM level, were
resolved by COMNAVSHIPS, and were resolved by
COMNAVSHIPS, and were resolved at the CNM level.
4. The average time to resolve a major exception was:
less than 2 months 2
2-4 months 3
more than 4 months 6
If there is disagreement on an SPD, and there is a critical
time period for the need of the GFE, the PARM should not
let a "piece of paper" (SPD) hold him up from starting his
work on procuring that GFE.
YES 8_ NO 4
Remarks:
6. If the 21 day acceptance/rejection period can not be complied
with and both SHAPM and PARM cannot work out a resolution
within the required 15 days after rejection, the SHAPM/PM
should automatically go to higher authority for resolution.





C. The following questions are concerned with the requirement that
PARMS develop a list of standard jobs and task elements with
adequate descriptions which should be maintained on file with
NAVSHIPS 051.
1. Have you complied with this requirement?
YES 4 NO 10
Remarks
:
2. Do you feel it is a necessary and useful requirement?
YES 6 NO 8
Remarks:
D. The following questions concern area of reporting requirements
by PARMS.
1. Are the required reports, in the format and at the time in-
tervals specified, currently being submitted?
YES 15 NO 1
Remarks
2. Do present reporting requirements in any way constitute
"over- control" by the SHAPM?
YES 10 NO 7
Remarks
3. Would you prefer to have more leeway in submitting required
reports?




4. Would additional reporting requirements constitute "over,
control"?
YES 10 NO 3
Remarks:
E. The following questions concern the area of PART I tasking
assignments.
1. PART I of the SPD currently provides the PARM with
sufficient detail and clarity to enable him to adequately
scope and price the impending job.
YES 4 NO 10
Remarks
:
2. PART I of the SPD are too lengthy and can, in most cases,
be shortened and still retain the clarity of defined Manage-
ment Tasks to be performed.
YES 12 NO 4
Remarks:
3. Are there any other items not currently covered in PART I
that would assist you in doing your work?
YES 7 NO 9
Remarks
F. The following questions are concerned with pricing of PART II
of SPD.
1. PARMS are expected to provide the SHAPM with sufficient
information including citing comparative procurement
documents to ensure that the SHAPM understands and agrees
to cost estimate(s). Is this complied with?




2. Do you feel that SHAPM makes good use of this information?
YES 9 NO 4
Remarks
:
G. The following questions concern the issue of SHAPM primacy.
1. Current DOD policy stresses the importance of Project
Managers managing their programs. As a PARM do you
recognize and observe this principle in your dealings with
SHAPM?
YES 17 NO 1
Remarks
2. Do you feel that the SPD process authoritatively defines and
supports the authority, responsibility and accountability of
the SHAPM?
YES 15 NO 3
Remarks:
H. The following questions are of a general nature and relate to the
mechanics of the SPD process as they relate to your program.
1. Do you feel that the NAVSHIPS/NAVORD/NAVELEX Interface
Management Task Force serves a useful function.
YES 11 NO 4
Remarks:
2. Do you feel that this task force resolves interface problems
or merely delays them?




NAVSHIPS INST 7000. 29B, in effect, is one SYSCOM directing
another. It would be more authoritative if it were issued in
its present form as a CNM Instruction.
,AGREE 9 DISAGREE 8
Remarks:
The SPD process is an attempt to solve with paper what is
basically an organizational and command problem.









Background and basis for issue of Ship Project Directive, should




The Project's policy on changes to GFE should be
expressed. In addition, the PARM's participation in controlling the
configuration of contractor furnished equipment under his technical
cognizance should be spelled out explicitly or by invoking some other
document.
(2) Data Management
Define the PARM's participation in the establishment of
data requirements, and in the acquisition, collection, distribution,
filing, retrieval, and updating of data for the ship class.
(3) Security
Invoke the security guidance covering the particular ship
design.
Require the PARM to provide guidance on classification of
equipment and subsystems for which he is responsible.
(4) Cost and Schedule Management
If any requirements beyond normal Quarterly Production
Progress Conference (QPPC) routine progress reporting and standard




PARM review of TDP's, PMP's, contract proposals, and
other across-the-board software not tied to particular discipline or sub-
systems should be spelled out here.
(6) Delegation of Authority to the PARM by the SHAPM
It may be desirable to require the PARM to act for the
SHAPM. For example, it is possible to delegate to him approval
authority for some technical documentation provided by the shipbuilder.
The extent of the delegation and the means through which it is to be
exercised, should be spelled out here.
(7) Required Membership on Committees, Boards, etc.
In addition to the SHAPM Project Change Control Board,
the SHAPM may establish other committees and teams requiring PARM
representation. Any such committee type actions should be listed here,
although details on how they function may be handled in other portions
of the SPD.
b. Ship System Engineering
(1) Whole Ship Studies
The scope of support by the PARMS must be spelled out
for each ship project.
(2) Ship Systems Integration
The contribution of the PARM should be stated, and any
constraints which he must comply with must be invoked. For example,
if the integration of the combat system is to be done in accordance with
some plan which sets physical parameters, casualty philosophy, and
so forth, that plan must be invoked.
(3) Ship Systems Safety Engineering
PARM support required to review ship designs for safety
aspects should be defined and applicable sections of MIL-STD-882
should be utilized as a guide.
(4) Quality Assurance
The QA requirements should be placed here. The level of




(5) System Test and Evaluation
Documentation which the PARM is required to provide as
an input to the formal ship test program should be defined. His per-
sonnel support in this area should also be laid out.
(6) Installation and Check-out
The extent of documentation and personnel support to be
provided for installation and check-out of equipment and subsystems
should be spelled out. This is particularly important in the case of
complex systems such as missile systems, where a special team may
be put together to check-out a system comprised of equipment furn-
ished by several Systems Commanders.
(7) Design Work Study in Shipbuilding
Place a requirement on the PARM to establish the manning
requirements for the hardware system or equipment he is responsible
for (or the ship design in the case of NAVSEC), together with the sup-
porting documentation showing how the operational and maintenance
requirements were arrived at.
(8) Human Engineering
The extent of human engineering to be carried out should
be described. For example, a system which requires a very rapid
response, like a threat- reactive missile control, may require an end-
to-end human engineering study to insure that human time lag and error
do not subvert its intent. What support is expected of the PARM in
such a study should be spelled out.
(9) Risk Management
The SHAPM is required to identify risks and to have a
Risk Management Plan to control them. The actions which he requires
of a PARM to assist in preparation of details and execution of the Risk
Management Plan should be spelled out here. For example, if a special
analysis by the PARM is required to permit a decision as to whether
some risk item will be used or a fall back will be employed, the analysis
should be called out here.
(10) Engineering Interface Standards for Shipboard Systems
and other Constraints
The interface requirements and constraints to be invoked
for a system to be installed aboard ship should be defined to the PARM.
Existing Engineering Interface Standards should be invoked here.
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c. Equipment Engineering/Production Standardization
(1) Component/Equipment Standardization- state or reference
the standardization objectives of the project; for example, all equip-
ments of all ships of the class identical; all computers employed to be
AN/UYK-7; not over 10% of equipments to have new CID numbers; and
so forth.
Provide guidance to the PARM on the steps to be taken to
insure that out-year ships will have equipment identical with current
year ships, and specifically cover the issues of multi-year equipment
procurement, standardization D&F's, options and advance procurement.
(2) Reliability Engineering
Advise the PARM what his reliability engineering require-
ments are and under what conditions they are to be achieved. This
will probably have to be done by invoking the appropriate reliability
engineering military standard, instruction, etc.
(3) Maintainability Engineering
Any special maintainability requirements to be met by
the equipment should be called out here.
The provision of MEAR's for use in the ILS project will
be covered under the heading of Integrated Logistic Support (paragraph
d. below).
(4) Signature Engineering
Any special requirements on equipment silencing, mag-
netic signature, or electromagnetic radiation signature should be
called out here.
(5) Equipment Safety Engineering
PARM support required to review eqviipment for safety
aspects should be defined.
(6) Engineering Interface Standards for Equipment and other
Technical Constraints
Place a requirement on the PARM to invoke Engineering




(7) Specific Actions to be taken by the PARM on Contractor
Furnished Equipment Under his Technical Cognizance
In some cases, the shipbuilder is developing equipment
which woxild normally be provided as GFE. In such cases, assistance
should be obtained from the cognizant NMC PARM to insure that it is
properly developed, and where appropriate, service approved.
(8) Equipment Installation and Check-out
Documentation and assistance to be provided for installa-
tion and check-out of GFE should be spelled out here.
d. Integrated Logistic Support
PARM support required to formulate the Ship Project
Integrated Logistic Support Plan should be defined. Application of
Logistics Support Analysis techniques (NAVMATINST 4000.20, current
version) in hardware acquisition and the extent of the application of
ILS by the PARM should be described.
e. Special Government Furnished Information (GFI) Requirements
NAVSEC may be required to develop a list of GFI, obtain con-
currence that it is adequate from the cognizant SUPSHIP, schedule it,
obtain it, and deliver it. This covers not only GFI furnished with
hardware but other GFI where required. (Note: Where GFI is to be
delivered separately and will be so cited in a Ship Contract schedule,
it will be listed in Part III, Section B. )
3. Schedule
Pertinent dates (Note: GFM dockside or equivalent delivery dates









7. Format Guide Statement
In preparing this Part I, the SHAPM has reviewed and considered
each area of the Format Guide for applicability. Therefore, any area






The SPD Financial Report (Appendix A) will be maintained by
PARMs and copies forwarded monthly to the cognizant SHAPM; the
first report to be submitted within 60 days after assignment of Current
Direction dollars. This report will be by each ship hull number
covered by the SPD Part II and will provide detailed information for
each Part II item of the SPD as shown in Appendix A and explained
below:
1. (SCHED A) _ Schedule A number for the item of GFE
2. (SEQ CODE) - SPD line item number
3. (NOMENCLATURE) - Self explanatory
4. (QTY) - Self explanatory
5. (DIRECTED $) - Self explanatory
6. (PROC. DOC.) - Latest funding document number for that
SPD Part II line item. (PR, Contract,
Allotment, Project Order, NAVCOMPT
140, etc. )
7. (RES/PROCESS) - Funds reserved for documents in
process
8. (COM $) - Funds committed
9. (OBL $) - Funds obligated
10. (SURP $) - Funds available in Current Direction for this
SPD Part II line item which are neither
obligated, committed nor in process
11. (DEF $) - Funds which are obligated, committed or in
process for this SPD Part II line item in
excess of Current Direction
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QUARTERLY GOVERNMENT FURNISHED MATERIAL STATUS REPORT
Format
The SPD Quarterly Government Furnished Material Status Report
(Appendix B) will be maintained by PARMs and copies forwarded quar-
terly to the cognizant SHAPM; the first report to be submitted within
90 days after acceptance of the SPD. This report will be by each ship
hull number covered by the SPD Part III Schedule (GFE Schedule, GFI
Schedule, TSE Schedule) and will provide detailed information for each
Part III item of the SPD as shown in Appendix B and explained below.
1. (A ITEM) _ Schedule A, GFI or TSE Schedule Number
from the Shipbuilding Contract
2. (SPD ITEM) - The Part III Schedule and the line item
number in that schedule (e.g., AZ13, B31
or C14)
3. (PII NUMBER) - Procurement Instrument Identification
number
4. (QTY) - Self explanatory
5. (BUY ITEM DESIGNATION) - The identification of an
item of GFM to be procured
6. (TYPE PROC) - A symbol denoting the type of procurement
prepared or to be prepared
7. (DELY DATE) - The dockside delivery date for an item on
Part III as expressed in the Part III of the
SPD
8. (AWARD DATE) -The date of contract award, either actual
or planned as appropriate, for the acquisi-
tion of the Part III line item being reported
9. (LAST ACTION) -A symbol denoting the type of action in the
sequence of acquisition actions which




10. (NEXT ACTION) -A symbol denoting the type of action in
the sequence of acquisition actions which
is planned to occur next, and the date
when the action is planned to occur
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MATERIAL STATUS VARIANCE REPORT
Format
The SPD Monthly Government Furnished Material Status Variance
Report (Appendix C) will be maintained by PARMs and copies forwarded
monthly, as required, to the cognizant SHAPM (See paragraph 2 below).
This report will be by each ship hull number covered by the SPD Part
III Schedule (GFE Schedule, GFI Schedule, TSE Schedule) and will
provide variances and detailed information for variances to the latest
Quarterly Government Furnished Material Report. The report is
described in Appendix C and is explained below:
1. (A ITEM) - Schedule A, GFI or TSE Schedule Number
from the Shipbuilding Contract
2. (SPD ITEM) - The Part II Schedule and the line item
number in that schedule (e. g. , A187, B29
or C42)
3. (PII NUMBER) - Procurement Instrument Identification
numb e r
4. (QTY) - Self explanatory
5. (BUY ITEM DESIGNATION) - The identification of an item
of GFM to be procured
6. (STATUS VARIANCE) _ Identification of the type of status
variance (e. g. , DELVRY DATE,
if there is a delivery date change,
BUY ITEM DESIGNATION, if there
is a nomenclature change, etc. If
a partial GFM delivery has been
received, the entry PARTIAL will
appear in this space). The column
of the Quarterly Reports (Appendix




(AUTH REF DOC) Identification of document authorizing
the change (e. g. , SPD Revision No.
,
ECP, letter, etc. )
8. (ORIGINAL) Identification of the original planning date
or schedule delivery date which requires
SHAPM concurrence for change proposed
(REVISION) If the variance is a delivery or procurement
planning date change, the proposed delivery
date will be shown. If the item itself is
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